2. Philosophical Axioms, must be kept within their proper bounds, and limited to a finite power; for instance, Ex nihilo nihil fit, that out of nothing proceeds nothing, is a truth, if it be understood with reference to a finite power. So A privatione ad habitum non datur regressus, is a truth upon the same terms. Sic una numero essentia non potest esse in tribus personis; that one and the same numerical essence, cannot be in three distinct persons, is a truth limited, as before; I mean, with reference to a finite power; but all this, and ten thousand Arguments more of this nature, cannot overthrow this principle, that there are three persons, and one God; for we are not speaking now of that which is finite, but of that which is infinite. Suppose this Question should be started; how the same numerical essence can be in three persons? possibly an answer might be returned thus. Suppose a father begets a son, and communicates to him the same numerical soul and body which he hath still himself, and both of these should communicate the same soul and body to a third, here would be three distinct persons, yet the same essence in them all; but I know a reply would quickly be made, This is impossible; answer must be made, It is true, as to that which is finite, but not unto that which is infinite, &c.
2. Philosophical Axiomes, must be kept within their proper bounds, and limited to a finite power; for instance, Ex nihilo nihil fit, that out of nothing proceeds nothing, is a truth, if it be understood with reference to a finite power. So A privatione ad habitum non datur regressus, is a truth upon the same termes. Sic una numero essentia non potest esse in tribus personis; that one and the same numerical essence, cannot be in three distinct persons, is a truth limited, as before; I mean, with reference to a finite power; but all this, and ten thousand Arguments more of this nature, cannot overthrow this principle, that there are three persons, and one God; for we are not speaking now of that which is finite, but of that which is infinite. Suppose this Question should be started; how the same numerical essence can be in three persons? possibly an answer might be returned thus. Suppose a father begets a sonne, and communicates to him the same numerical soul and body which he hath still himself, and both of these should communicate the same soul and body to a third, here would be three distinct persons, yet the same essence in them all; but I know a reply would quickly be made, This is impossible; answer must be made, It is true, as to that which is finite, but not unto that which is infinite, &c.