The word Only I put into the proposition [and the Doctor himself speaks as much, Here is the chief and only seat of the doctrine of Schism, p. 42.] else though I yield such a definition agrees with a particular instance, yet it agreeth not with the whole specific nature of the fin which we are enquiring into, and therefore not logical. Doth every Scripture-instance give a full definition of the fin forbidden? The Command saith Thou shalt not steal, in Exod. ⟨p. 9⟩22.2. I find mention made of a thief breaking in, &c. to which Christ alludes Mat. 24.43. Suppose there were no other instance of theft in all the Scripture, shall I now go set forth a book about the true nature of theft, and go to this Instance, and there ground my Definition, and say, Theft is an illegal and violent breaking into a mans house and taking away goods against the owners will, and say nothing else can be Theft in the precise notion of Scripture, because the Scripture-instance calls nothing else theft? This were strange. Is not robbing at Sea theft, though no such instance is found in Scripture? That definition given, Furtum est ablatio injusta rei alienae invito domino, will fetch in all theft. It is true, every particular Act of any sin forbidden hath the specific nature of that sin in it: If a man take my goods unjustly, whether it be at sea, or on the high-way, out of my house openly or privately, and several other ways, all these have the specific nature of theft in them, and theft is predicated of them; we do not make several definitions of theft because there are several Acts: Unius rei una tantum est definitio. There may be divers degrees of the same sin [as there is of Schism] yet gradus non variant speciem. But we do not use to go to particular Acts of any sin, and out of such an Act fetch the definition of the sin confining the specific nature [which is more large] to that individual or singular Act.
The word Onely I put into the proposition [and the Doctor himself speaks as much, Here is the chief and onely seat of the doctrine of Schism, p. 42.] else though I yield such a definition agrees with a particular instance, yet it agreeth not with the whole specifical nature of the fin which we are enquiring into, and therefore not logical. Doth every Scripture-instance give a full definition of the fin forbidden? The Command saith Thou shalt not steal, in Exod. ⟨p. 9⟩22.2. I finde mention made of a thief breaking in, &c. to which Christ alludes Mat. 24.43. Suppose there were no other instance of theft in all the Scripture, shall I now goe set forth a book about the true nature of theft, and goe to this Instance, and there ground my Definition, and say, Theft is an illegal and violent breaking into a mans house and taking away goods against the owners will, and say nothing else can be Theft in the precise notion of Scripture, because the Scripture-instance calls nothing else theft? This were strange. Is not robbing at Sea theft, though no such instance is found in Scripture? That definition given, Furtum est ablatio injusta rei alienae invito domino, will fetch in all theft. It is true, every particular Act of any sin forbidden hath the specifical nature of that sin in it: If a man take my goods unjustly, whether it be at sea, or on the high-way, out of my house openly or privately, and several other ways, all these have the specifical nature of theft in them, and theft is predicated of them; we doe not make several definitions of theft because there are several Acts: Ʋnius rei una tantum est definitio. There may be divers degrees of the same sin [as there is of Schism] yet gradus non variant speciem. But we do not use to goe to particular Acts of any sin, and out of such an Act fetch the definition of the sin confining the specifical nature [which is more large] to that individual or singular Act.