A free disputation against pretended liberty of conscience tending to resolve doubts moved

But touching an erring conscience, the question is not whether an erroneous conscience doth so tie, that we must do nothing on the contrary, nor is the question whether the nearest actually obliging rule, be conscience; the Arminians tell us, Though the word of God, of it self, and by it self, have power to oblige, yet it actually obligeth no man, except it be understood, and so is believed to be understood, after we use all possible diligence and prudence, for no man is obliged to follow the true sense of the word against his conscience, though it be erroneous; but we think the word of God is both the farrest and nearest, and the only obliging rule, and that the dytement of the conscience doth neither ⟨p. 134⟩bind potentially nor actually,¹ but is a mere […], a messenger and an official relater of the will and mind to God, to us, and all the obliging power is from the word, […] the messenger of a King and Judge, is not the obliging […] that ties the subject, or the Heralds promulgation of the Law, is no obliging rule, for promulgation of Heralds, is common both to just and to unjust laws, and certainly unjust laws from a just Prince lay no band on the conscience or on the man, far less can the promulgation as the promulgation lay any bands on the conscience, the word of a Messenger and Herald is at the best but a condition, or the approximation of the obliging power to us, but all the obliging power is from the King and the Judge. It is most false then, that these Libertines say, that the word doth not actually oblige, except it be understood, for the understanding, information, and indycement of conscience, doth not add any actual obligation to the word that it had not before, it only is a Reporter, to carry both the word and the actual obligation to the man; the Herald promulgating the law, adds no obligation actual or potential to the law that it had not before, only it makes an union, in distance, and near application and conjunction between the actually obliging law, and the understanding knowledge of the person, or subject, who is obliged to keep the law, though it be true the fire cannot actually burn, but as timber is cast to it, yet the fire hath from its own nature both potential and actual burning, not from the act of casting the timber in the fire;

But touching an erring conscience, the question is not whether an erroneous conscience doth so tye, that we must do nothing on the contrary, nor is the question whether the nearest actually obliging rule, be conscience; the Arminians tell us, Though the word of God, of it selfe, and by it selfe, have power to oblige, yet it actually obligeth no man, except it be understood, and so is beleeved to bee understood, after we use all possible diligence and prudence, for no man is obliged to follow the true sense of the word against his conscience, though it be erroneous; but we thinke the word of God is both the farrest and nearest, and the onely obliging rule, and that the dytement of the conscience doth neither