Touching the nature of Conscience.1 It seemeth to me to be a power of the practical understanding according to which the man is obliged and directed to give judgment of himself, that is of his state and condition, and of all his actions, inclinations, thoughts, and words. It is first an understanding power, not an act or an actual judgement. 1. It is nor a distinct faculty from the understanding, but the understanding as it giveth judgement, in court, of the mans state and of all his ways, as whether he be in favour with God or no, and now whether he be in Christ, or not, and of all his motions and actions within or without. But it would appear not to be an act, because to oblige, to direct ⟨p. 4⟩to accus••, are acts of the Conscience, and therefore do […] slow from other acts; it is true, the thoughts, Rom. 2. 15. […] said to ••cuse, or ••cuse, but by thoughts there is mea•• the Conscience […] not first thinking, and then accusing, but the Conscience breathing out the bad or good […] or […] longing and accusing, or of exercising and conforming though, and acts. All acts flow from either young powers, which they call potency, or from stronger and more aged and indicated powers,2 which they call habits: Things produced by motion, and motion It self, are the effects of the never (saith Amesing de […]) cap. 1. […]. 4. ••nd therefore the act of accusing may be from the Conscience which is an act; this consequence cannot stand; the motion, and the thing produced by motion, is from the mover, true, but the act of moving is from the mover, as he actuateth his power, so is directing, accusing from the power in the practical understanding; not from the act of understanding which is nothing in this case,3 but the act of accusing, and nothing can come from it self as a cause. 2. When the believer or wicked men go to sleep, and put off their clothes, they do not put off their Conscience, and though the conscience sleeps not with the man, yet doth it not in sleep, necessarily act by accusing, or excusing, and therefore remaineth as a power in man, not ever acting; See Malderus in 12. q. 19. Disp. 82. ar 4. 5.
Touching the nature of Conscience.1 It seemeth to me to be a power of the practicall vnderstanding according to which the man is oblidged and directed to give judgment of himselfe, that is of his state and condition, and of all his actions, inclinations, thoughts, and words. It is first an understanding power, not an act or an actuall judgement. 1. It is nor a distinct facultie from the understanding, but the understanding as it giveth judgement, in court, of the mans state and of all his waies, as whether hee be in favour with God or no, and now whether he be in Christ, or not, and of all his motions and actions within or without. But it would appeare not to be an act, because to oblidge, to direct ⟨p. 4⟩to accus••, are acts of the Conscience, and therefore doe 〈…〉 slow from other acts; it is true, the thoughts, Rom. 2. 15. 〈…〉 said to ••cuse, or ••cuse, but by thoughts there is mea•• the Conscience 〈…〉 not first thinking, and then accusing, but the Conscience brething out the bad or good 〈…〉 or 〈…〉 longing and accusing, or of exercising and conforming though, and acts. All acts flow from either young powers, which they call potencie, or from stronger and more aged and indicated powers,2 which they call habits: Things produced by motion, and motion It selfe, are the effects of the never (saith Amesing de 〈…〉) cap. 1. 〈…〉. 4. ••nd therefore the act of accusing may be from the Conscience which is an act; this consequence cannot stand; the motion, and the thing produced by motion, is from the mover, true, but the act of moving is from the mover, as he actuateth his power, so is directing, accusing from the power in the practical understanding; not from the act of understanding which is nothing in this case,3 but the act of accusing, and nothing can come from it self as a cause. 2. When the beleever or wicked men go to sleep, and put off their cloaths, they doe not put off their Conscience, and though the conscience sleeps not with the man, yet doth it not in sleep, necessarily act by accusing, or excusing, and therefore remaineth as a power in man, not ever acting; See Malderus in 12. q. 19. Disp. 82. ar 4. 5.
- 1Conscience a power, not an act or habit.
- 2[…] Thomas 12. •. 19 a•t. 5. Casetan. ibid. Richard. 2. •. 29. ar 1. 2.〈…〉 Thomas 12. •. 19 a•t. 5. Casetan. ibid. Richard. 2. •. 29. ar 1. 2.
- 3Grego. de Valent. 12. q. 14. punct. 4. Vasqu. z. 12. disp. 59 c. 1. Tannet. tom. 2 dip. 2. q. 4 dub• 4.Grego. de Valent. 12. q. 14. punct. 4. Vasqu. z. 12. disp. 59 c. 1. Tannet. tom. 2 di•p. 2. q. 4 dub• 4.