A92147:1090
A treatise of civil policy
A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning prerogative, right and privilege, in reference to the supreme prince and the people. / By Samuel Rutherford professor of divinity of St Andrews in Scotland.A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning prerogative, right and priviledge, in reference to the supream prince and the people. / By Samuel Rutherford professor of divintiy of St Andrews in Scotland.
London, : Printed and are to be sold by Simon Miller at the Star in St Pauls Church-yard near the West end., 1657 i.e. 1656
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
6. This Distinction is neither grounded upon Reason or Laws, nor on any Word of God. Not the former, as is proved before, for there is no absolute power in a King to do above, or against law; all the official power that a King hath, is a Royal power to do good, for the safety and good of his subjects, and that according to law and ⟨p. 392⟩reason, and there is no other power given to a King as a King, and for Scripture Arnisaeus, ibid. allegeth 1 Sam. 8. The manner or law of the King. ver. 9. 11. And he saith, it cannot be the custom and manner of the King, but must be the law of absolute Majesty. 1. Because it was the manner of inferior judges, as Tiberius said of his judges, to flea the people, when they were commanded to shear them only. 2. Samuel's sons who wrested judgment and perverted the law, had this manner and custom to oppress the people, as did the sons of Eli: and therefore without reason is it called the law of Kings, jus regum, if it was the law of the judges, for if all this law be Tyrannical and but an abuse 1of Kingly power, the same law may agree to all other Magistrates, who by the same unjust power may abuse their power, but Samuel (as Brentius observeth homi. 27. in 1 Sam. in princ.) doth mean here a greater license then Kings can challenge, if at any time they would make use of their plenitude of absolute power, and therefore, nomine juris, by the word [law] here he understandeth a power granted by law, jure, or right to the King, but pernicious to the people, which Gregory calleth jus regium Tyrannorum, the Royal law of Tyrants.—So Seneca 1 de clem. c. 11. hoc interest inter regem & Tyrannum, Species ipsa fortunae ac licentiae par est, nisi quod Tyranni ex volutate saeviunt, Reges non nisi ex causa & necessitate? quid ergo? non Reges quoque accidere solent? sed quoties fieri publica utilitas persuadet, Tirannis saevitia cordi est. A Tyran (saith Arnisaeus) in this differeth from a King, Qui ne ea quidem vult, quae sibi licent, that a King will not do these things which are lawful; a Tyran doth quae libet, what he pleaseth to do.
6. This Distinction is neither grounded upon Reason or Lawes, nor on any Word of God. Not the former, as is proved before, for there is no absolute power in a King to do above, or against law; all the officiall power that a King hath, is a Royall power to do good, for the safety and good of his subjects, and that according to law and