A treatise of civil policy

and to oppress a subject, is from God, and so must be a lawful power; but the conclusion is absurd, the assumption is the doctrine of Barclay: The major proposition I prove. 1. Because both the Judge and the King was from God, for God gave Moses a lawful calling to be a Judge, so did he to Eli, to Samuel, and Deut. 17. 15. the King is a lawful Ordinance of God: If then the Judge and the King, be both lawful Ordinances, and if they differ essentially, as Barclay saith; then that specifice form which distinguisheth the one from the other, to wit, Domination and a power to destroy the subject, must be from God, which is blasphemous; for God can give no moral power to do wickedly; for that is licence, and a power to sin against a Law of God, which is absolutely inconsistent with the holiness of God; for so the Lord might deny himself, and dispense with sin (God avert such blasphemies.) Now if the kingly power be from God, That which essentially and specifically constituteth a King, must be from God, as the Office it self is from God: And ^dBarclay saith expressly, That the kingly power is from God, and that same which is the specifice form, that constituteth a King, must be that which essentially separateth the King from the Judge, if they be essentially different, as Barclay dreameth. Hence have we this jus Regis, this Manner or Law of the King, to tyrannize and oppress, to be a power from God, and so a lawful power; by which you shall have this result of Barclay's interpretation, That God made a Tyrant as well as a King. 3. By this difference that Barclay putteth betwixt the King and the Judge, the Judge might be resisted; for he had not this power of domination, that Saul hath, contrary to Rom. 13. 2. Exod. 22. 28. and 20, 12.

and to oppresse a subject, is from God, and so must be a lawfull power; but the conclusion is absurd, the assumption is the doctrine of Barclay: The major proposition I prove. 1. Because both the Iudge and the King was from God, for God gave Moses a lawfull calling to be a Iudge, so did he to Eli, to Samuel, and Deut. 17. 15. the King is a lawfull Ordinance of God: If then the Judge and the King, be both lawfull Ordinances, and if they differ essentially, as Barclay saith; then that specifice forme which distinguisheth the one from the other, to wit, Domination and a power to destroy the subject, must be from God, which is blasphemous; for God can give no morall power to do wickedly; for that is licence, and a power to sin against a Law of God, which is absolutely inconsistent with the holinesse of God; for so the Lord might deny himself, and dispence with sin (God avert such blasphemies.) Now if the kingly power be from God, That which essentially and specifically constituteth a King, must be from God, as the Office it self is from God: And