A92147:455
A treatise of civil policy
A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning prerogative, right and privilege, in reference to the supreme prince and the people. / By Samuel Rutherford professor of divinity of St Andrews in Scotland.A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning prerogative, right and priviledge, in reference to the supream prince and the people. / By Samuel Rutherford professor of divintiy of St Andrews in Scotland.
London, : Printed and are to be sold by Simon Miller at the Star in St Pauls Church-yard near the West end., 1657 i.e. 1656
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Every giver of a benefit, as a giver, is superior to him to whom the gift is given; though after the servant hath given away his gift of liberty, by which he was superior, he cannot be a superior, because by his gift he hath made himself inferior. 3. The People constituteth a King above themselves, I distinguish, supra see, above themselves, according to the fountain power of Royalty, that is false; for the fountain-power remaineth most eminently in the people, 1. because they give it to the King, ad modum recipientis, and with limitations, ergo, it is unlimited in the people, and bounded and limited in the King, and so less in the King then in the people. 2. If the King turn distracted, and an ill spirit from the Lord come upon Saul, so as reason be taken from a Nebuchadnezzar, it is certain the people may put Curators and Tutors over him, who hath the Royal power. 3. If the King be absent, and taken captive, the People may give the Royal power to one, or to some few to exercise it as custodes regni. And 4. if he die, and the Crown go by election, they may create another with more or less power: all which evinceth, that they never constituted over themselves a King, in regard of fountain-power; for if they give away the fountain, as a slave selleth his liberty, they could not make use of it. Indeed they set a King above them, quoad potestatem legum executivam, in regard of a power of executing laws and actual government, ⟨p. 149⟩for their good and safety: but this proveth only that the King is above the people, [Greek or Hebrew], in some respect; but the most eminent and fountain-power of Royalty remaineth in the people, as in an immortal spring, which they communicate by succession to this or1 that mortal man, in the manner and measure that they think good: And Ulpian and Bartolus, cited by our Prelate out of Barclaius, are only to be understood of the derived, secondary and borrowed power of executing laws, and not of the fountain power, which the people cannot give away, no more then they can give away their rational nature; for it is a power natural, to conserve themselves, essentially adhering to every created Being: For, if the People give all their power away, 1. What shall they reserve to make a new King, if this man dye? 2. What if the Royal line surcease? there be no Prophets immediately sent of God, to make Kings. 3.
Every giver of a benefit, as a giver, is superior to him to whom the gift is given; though after the servant hath given away his gift of libertie, by which he was superiour, he cannot be a superior, because by his gift he hath made himselfe inferior. 3. The People constituteth a King above themselves, I distinguish, supra se, above themselves, according to the fountaine power of Royaltie, that is false; for the fountaine-power remaineth most eminently in the people, 1. because they give it to the King, ad modum recipientis, and with limitations, ergo, it is unlimited in the people, and bounded and limited in the King, and so lesse in the King then in the people. 2. If the King turne distracted, and an ill spirit from the Lord come upon Saul, so as reason be taken from a Nebuchadnezzar, it is certaine the people may put Curators and Tutors over him, who hath the Royall power. 3. If the King be absent, and taken captive, the People may give the Royall power to one, or to some few to exercise it as custodes regni. And 4. if he die, and the Crown goe by election, they may create another with more or lesse power: all which evinceth, that they never constituted over themselves a King, in regard of fountaine-power; for if they give away the fountaine, as a slave selleth his libertie, they could not make use of it. Indeed they set a King above them, quoad potestatem legum executivam, in regard of a power of executing lawes and actuall government,