A treatise of civil policy

Barclaim, Grotius, Doct. Ferne, (The P. Prelates wit could come ¹up to it) say, That absolute power to do ill, so as no mortal man can lawfully resist it, is from God; and the King hath this way power from God as no subject •an resist it, but he must resist the Ordinance of God, and yet the power of tyranny is not simply from God.

Barclaim, Grotius, Doct. Ferne, (The P. Prelates wit could come ¹up t̄o it) say, That absolute power to do ill, so as no mortall man can lawfully resist it, is from God; and the King hath this way power from God as no subject •an resist it, but he must resist the Ordinance of God, and yet the power of tyranny is not simply from God.

1. 1Barclaius contr. Monarcho. l. 2. pag. 62.

Answ. The Law saith, Illud possumus quod jure possumus, Papinus ¹F. filius, D. de cond. Just. The Law saith, It is no power which is not lawful power. The Royalists say, power of Tyranny in so far as it may be resisted, and is punishable by men, is not from God; but what is the other part of the distinction; it must be, that Tyrannical power is simpliciter from God, or in it self it is from God, but as it is punishable or restrainable by subjects, it is not from God: now to be punishable by subjects, is but an accident and tyrannical power is the subject, yea, and it is an separable accident; for many Tyrants are never punished, and their power is never restrained, such a Tyrant was Saul, and many persecuting Emperors: Now if the Tyrannical power it self was from God, the argument is yet valid, and remaineth unanswered; and shall not this fall to the ground as false, which Arnisaeus de autho. princ. c. 2. n. 10. Dumb contra officium facit, Magistratus non est Magistratus, quippe a quo non injuria, sed jus nasci debeat, l. meminerint. 6. C. unde vi. din. in C. quod quis, 24. n. 4, 5.—Et de ho neminem dubitare aut dissentire scribit, Marant. disp. 1. num. 14. When the Magistrate doth by violence, and without law any thing, in so far doing against his Office, he is not a Magistrate; then say I, that power by which he doth, is not of God. 2. None doeth then resist the Ordinance of God, who resist the King in Tyrannous acts. 2. If the power, as it cannot be punished by the subject nor restrained, be from God. Ergo, the Tyrannical power itself, and without this accident (that it can be punished by men) it must be from God also; but the conclusion is absurd, and denied by Royalists. I prove the connection: For if the King have such a power above all restraint, the power itself, to wit, King Davids power to kill innocent Uriah, and deflower Bathsheba, without the accident, of being restrained or punished by men, is either from God, or not from God; if it be from God, it must be a power against the sixth and seventh Commandment, which God gave to David, and not to any subject, and so David lied when he confessed this sin and this sin cannot be pardoned because it was no sin; and Kings because Kings, are under no tie of duties