A92147:811
A treatise of civil policy
A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning prerogative, right and privilege, in reference to the supreme prince and the people. / By Samuel Rutherford professor of divinity of St Andrews in Scotland.A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning prerogative, right and priviledge, in reference to the supream prince and the people. / By Samuel Rutherford professor of divintiy of St Andrews in Scotland.
London, : Printed and are to be sold by Simon Miller at the Star in St Pauls Church-yard near the West end., 1657 i.e. 1656
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. Because although it have a good meaning, which Ulpian saith, Quod principi placet legis vigorem habet. The Will of the Prince is the Law, yet the meaning is not that any thing is a just Law, because it is the Princes Will, for its rule formally: for it must be good and just before the Prince can will it, and then he finding it so, he puteth the stamp of a humane Law on it.
2. Because although it have a good meaning, which Vlpian saith, Quod principi placet legis vigorem habet. The Will of the Prince is the Law, yet the meaning is not that any thing is a just Law, because it is the Princes Will, for its rule formally: for it must be good and just before the Prince can will it, and then he finding it so, he puteth the stampe of a humane Law on it.
3. This is the difference between Gods Will, and the will of the1 King, or any mortal creature. Things are just and good, because God willeth them, especially things positively good (though I conceive it hold in all things) and God doth not will things, because they are good and just, But the creature, be he King, or any never so eminent, do will things, because they are good and just, and the ⟨p. 255⟩Kings willing of a thing, maketh it not good and just: for only Gods will, not the Creatures will, can be the cause why things are good and just. If therefore it be so, it must undeniably hence follow, that the Kings will maketh not a just Law to have an unjust and bloody sense: and he cannot, as King, by any absolute superdominion over the Law, put a just sense on a bloody and unjust Law.
3. This is the difference between Gods Will, and the will of the1 King, or any mortall creature. Things are just and good, because God willeth them, especially things positively good (though I conceive it hold in all things) and God doth not will things, because they are good and just, But the creature, be he King, or any never so eminent, doe will things, because they are good and just, and the