A95413:36
The doubting conscience resolved. In answer to a (pretended) perplexing question, &c. Wherein is…
The doubting conscience resolved. In answer to a (pretended) perplexing question, &c. Wherein is evidently proved, that the holy Scriptures (not the pope) is the foundation whereupon the Church is built. Or, That a Christian may be infallibly certain of his faith and religion by holy Scriptures. By William Twice D.D. Prolocutor of the Assembly of Divines. Written at the desire of Samuel Hartlib, Esquire, for the satisfaction of his friends beyond the seas; and now divulged in print for more public edification.The doubting conscience resolved. In answer to a (pretended) perplexing question, &c. Wherein is evidently proved, that the holy Scriptures (not the pope) is the foundation whereupon the Church is built. Or, That a Christian may be infallibly certain of his faith and religion by holy Scriptures. By William Tvvisse D.D. Prolocutor of the Assembly of Divines. Written at the desire of Samuel Hartlib, Esquire, for the satisfaction of his friends beyond the seas; and now divulged in print for more publick edification.
London: printed for Thomas Matthews, 1652
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Nor am I moved with that Objection, that it is enough for the Lutherans, that they are assured of the truth of Lutheranism, though others cannot see and believe it. For this is not that which I would have. I enquire, how a man may be sure not of his own opinion, but of the truth: Now if I believe and determine that such a thing is true, this is my opinion, yet is it not therefore the truth, seeing truth and opinion have nothing in them alike. A steadfast persuasion changeth not the essence of the thing whereof a man is persuaded. For then might melancholic persons, whose opinion is unmovable, work miracles, and make all their conceits essential. The nature of true knowledge is this, to be demonstrable, not to me, or some men, but to all, and to win a consent from any man, as two and three makes five. A thing controverted, and which some understand one way, some another, can never make me certain and free from doubt, whether I have ⟨image 13⟩the truth or no; and he that knows no other than what he determines may be excused of malice and hypocrisy. But this reasoning, I and my follower are sure of this thing, therefore it is true, is unreasonable reasoning.
Nor am I moved with that Objection, that it is enough for the Lutherans, that they are assured of the truth of Lutheranism, though others cannot see and believe it. For this is not that which I would have. I enquire, how a man may be sure not of his own opinion, but of the truth: Now if I believe and determine that such a thing is true, this is my opinion, yet is it not therefore the truth, seeing truth and opinion have nothing in them alike. A stedfast perswasion changeth not the essence of the thing whereof a man is perswaded. For then might melancholick persons, whose opinion is unmovable, work miracles, and make all their conceits essentiall. The nature of true knowledge is this, to be demonstrable, not to me, or some men, but to all, and to win a consent from any man, as two and three makes five. A thing controverted, and which some understand one way, some another, can never make me certain and free from doubt, whether I have ⟨image 13⟩the truth or no; and he that knowes no other than what he determines may be excused of malice and hypocrisie. But this reasoning, I and my follower are sure of this thing, therefore it is true, is unreasonable reasoning.