A97353:526
The second part of The nonconformists plea for peace being an account of their principles about civil and ecclesiastical authority and obedience ... : mostly written many years past, and now published to save our lives and the kingdoms peace, from the false and bloody plotters ... / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for John Hancock, 1680
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
52. The contracts or Laws by which the Multitude give up their Right to one Council, or one man, undoubtedly may be violated as soon as it is the interest of common safety to violate them. p. 288.
53. They that think it possible for one only to have the […] Civitatis j[…]s, do much err: For Right is determined only by Power; But one mans power is very unable for such a burden p. 202. When the people choose a King, he must choose Commanders, Councillors, friends, to whom he committeth both his own and the common safety, so that the Government which is taken to be Absolute Monarchy, is really in practice Aristocracy; not indeed manifest, but latent, and therefore the worst.
53. They that think it possible for one only to have the 〈…〉 Civitatis j〈…〉s, do much err: For Right is determined only by Power; But one mans power is very unable for such a burden p. 202. When the people choose a King, he must choose Commanders, Councellors, friends, to whom he committeth both his own and the common safety, so that the Government which is taken to be Absolute Monarchy, is really in practice Aristocracy; not indeed manifest, but latent, and therefore the worst.
Besides that a King, that's a child, sick, heavy with age, is a precarious King: But they have indeed the chief power, who do the chief business of the Government, or are next the King: to pass by, that a King liable to last, doth oft manage all by the lust of one, or another Whore or Pander. p. 293.
Besides that a King, that's a child, sick, heavy with age, is a precarious King: But they have indeed the chief power, who do the chief buness of the Government, or are next the King: to pass by, that a King lyable to last, doth oft mannage all by the lust of one, or another Whore or Pandor. p. 293.
54. Hence it followeth that a King is so much the less sui juris, and the Subjects condition is so much the more miserable, by how much the more absolutely the Civitatis jus, (the public power) is transferred on him.— A Monarch is most sui juris, when he most consults the safety (or good) of the multitude. p. 293.
54. Hence it followeth that a King is so much the less sui juris, and the Subjects condition is so much the more miserable, by how much the more absolutely the Civitatis jus, (the publick power) is transferred on him.— A Monarch is most sui juris, when he most consults the safety (or good) of the multitude. p. 293.
55. As to religion, no Temples should be built at the public charge; nor laws be made about opinions, unless they be seditious, and overthrow the foundations of the City: But let them that are allowed public exercise of religion, build their own Temples, and the King have his Chapel. p. 301.
55. As to religion, no Temples should be built at the publick charge; nor laws be made about opinions, unless they be seditious, and overthrow the foundations of the City: But let them that are allowed publick exercise of religion, build their own Temples, and the King have his Chapel. p. 301.
His discourse for Aristocracy I pretermit; so much of Spinosa.
His discourse for Aristocacy I pretermit; so much of Spinosa.
The truth is (as Mr. Peter Ster[…] unhappily sound) it is hard avoiding this frame of Doctrine, for the Predeterminants who hold that the Volitions and actions of all men are predetermined by Gods necessitating unresistible promotion as the first cause of nature and motion, and that in all their modes and circumstances; and that the will can have no power to do any thing, more or less, than it is thus predetermined to do, and that moral good and evil are caused as necessarily by God as Light and Darkness are: Were these mens Physical conceits as certain, as all the principles of Religion, natural and revealed, which they totally overthrow, they might stagger many: But not when sick and proud mens dreams are set against mans common Light, right and interest.
THe truth is (as Mr. Peter Ster〈…〉 unhappily sound) it is hard avoiding this frame of Doctrine, for the Predeterminants who hold that the Volitions and actions of all men are predetermined by Gods necessitating unresistible promotion as the first cause of nature and motion, and that in all their modes and circumstances; and that the will can have no power to do any thing, more or less, than it is thus predetermined to do, and that moral good and evil are caused as necessarily by God as Light and Darkness are: Were these mens Physical conceits as certain, as all the principles of Religion, natural and revealed, which they totally overthrow, they might stagger many: But not when sick and proud mens dreams are set against mans common Light, right and interest.
IN all this the Reader must still remember, 1. that I recite other mens Political-principles, only that the accusers of my own and such others may compare them together, and see which they judge more rational and loyal; and what parties they can find in all the world, whose principles of Government they will rest in, when ours are condemned.
2. And yet I make not my self an arrogant censor of all that differ from me; but confess that singularity, especially in matters of other mens profession, excuseth suspicion in the Reader; and where he findeth me differ from the most of Protestants and Papists, he oweth no more regard to my judgement, than cogent evidence should command.
I confess though they word it variously, and also differ about the case of some particular Kingdoms, most of the forementioned sorts of Lawyers, Politic writers, Divines, &c. seem to differ from some of my principles; But many differ more in notion than in meaning. Most of them all make the multitude the prime subject and cause of sovereign power, from whom all sorts of chief Rulers do receive it: and that they do this for their necessary peace, safety and prosperity, which they may defend against perfidious betrayers of it, &c. But if you mark it, withal you shall find that, 1. they say that the Law of nature bindeth them to gather into Cities, and to choose governors; 2. and that they call the peoples Sovereignty or power, but as Mr. Hooker the Habit, and say the Act belongeth to the Ruler so chosen: and as others say, It is Majestas realis which yet may not actually Rule, but convey the Majestatem personalem to him or them that only must rule. By all which they plainly confess, 1. That God hath not left it to their choice whether they be a Governed society (Civitas) or not; For the Law of nature which is Gods Law, obligeth them to it. 2. That it is not actual Governing that he thus obligeth the multitude to, but to choose the species and persons that shall be Recipients. 3. And when they can name no more power but choosing the Recipients (one or more) and Limiting his power in matters of Propriety and other things to which God hath not by his Law extended it without their consent, it's plain that this is not to be the Givers of the Ruling power. Most changes in the world Physical and Moral are made by Diversification of the Dispositio Receptiva (most or many think Generation doth no more as to the soul.) This is not nothing. God saith [To men so qualified, and so chosen or lawfully receptive I will give such and such power as my Officers;] And He qualifieth ⟨p. 119⟩them, and the People choose or consent to the Persons in some places, and the successive families in others: so that Receptivity is of man, with some exceptions or Limitations; but the authority is immediately from God.
I confess though they word it variously, and also differ about the case of some particular Kingdoms, most of the forementioned sorts of Lawyers, Politick writers, Divines, &c. seem to differ from some of my principles; But many differ more in notion than in meaning. Most of them all make the multitude the prime subject and cause of soveraign power, from whom all sorts of chief Rulers do receive it: and that they do this for their necessary peace, safety and prosperity, which they may defend against perfidious betrayers of it, &c. But if you mark it, withal you shall find that, 1. they say that the Law of nature bindeth them to gather into Cities, and to choose governours; 2. and that they call the peoples Soveraignty or power, but as Mr. Hooker the Habit, and say the Act belongeth to the Ruler so chosen: and as others say, It is Majestas realis which yet may not actually Rule, but convey the Majestatem personalem to him or them that only must rule. By all which they plainly confess, 1. That God hath not left it to their choice whether they be a Governed society (Civitas) or not; For the Law of nature which is Gods Law, obligeth them to it. 2. That it is not actual Governing that he thus obligeth the multitude to, but to choose the species and persons that shall be Recipients. 3. And when they can name no more power but choosing the Recipients (one or more) and Limiting his power in matters of Propriety and other things to which God hath not by his Law extended it without their consent, it's plain that this is not to be the Givers of the Ruling power. Most changes in the world Physical and Moral are made by Diversification of the Dispositio Receptiva (most or many think Generation doth no more as to the soul.) This is not nothing. God saith [To men so qualified, and so chosen or lawfully receptive I will give such and such power as my Officers;] And He qualifieth
Gregory Sayrus is justly accounted one of the best and moderatest Popish Casuists that ever wrote, and in his excellent Clav. Regia he saith, Lib. 3. c. 1. p. 109, 110, &c. not only de fine (which most agree to) [Hanc particulam quod Lex ordinari debet ad bonum commune, Barth. Medina 1. 2. q. 90. a. 2. veram & intelligendam esse docet non solum de jure, sed etiam de facto, ut Lex illa quae in privatum commodum instituitur, ita ut nullo modo in utilitatem publicam referatur, lex non sit, sed iniquitas. Deinde ita intelligitur, ut si cesset ratio boni communis & ejus utilitas, statim lex cessat, & vim obligandi non habet: so Alph. à Castrol. 1. de potest. legis poenal. c. 5. doc. 3. And he addeth p. 111. himself [Where a Law ceaseth to be profitable to the Common-wealth, then it altogether ceaseth to be a Law, and is not obligatory (But this I have elsewhere fuller opened) And as to the question in hand [Haec cura populi & potestas super illum licet omnis à Deo sit, illam tamen homines diversimode à Deo habent, non semper à Deo immediate, sed saepe per populi consensum, à quo primum Deo annuente aut permittente illam accepit; nec majorem quam illi populus ob initio concessit: tam aperta & manifesta est haec populi potestas, &c.] And so he goeth on to prove out of Zenophon, Julian, Jurisc. the Canon Law, &c. that the community is quoddam totum liberum habens jus naturaliter regendi seipsum; ita hoc jus potest transferre in alium, & vices suas alteri delegare; and that Kings have been made by the people from the beginning, and from their consent the Governing power still cometh. And that [a Law not necessary by Gods making, made by a Lay Prince, the whole people contradicting, is of no ⟨p. 120⟩sore, […] the people have given their whole power to the […], which is to be known by th[…] ancient Custom of […] among them.]
Gregory Sayrus is justly accounted one of the best and moderatest Popish Casuists that ever wrote, and in his excellent Clav. Regia he saith, Lib. 3. c. 1. p. 109, 110, &c. not only de fine (which most agree to) [Hanc particulam quod Lex ordinari debet ad bonum commune, Barth. Medina 1. 2. q. 90. a. 2. veram & intelligendam esse docet non solum de jure, sed etiam de facto, ut Lex illa quae in privatum commodum instituitur, ita ut nullo modo in utilitatem publicam referatur, lex non sit, sed iniquitas. Deinde ita intelligitur, ut si cesset ratio boni communis & ejus utilitas, statim lex cessat, & vim obligandi non habet: so Alph. à Castrol. 1. de potest. legis poenal. c. 5. doc. 3. And he addeth p. 111. himself [Where a Law ceaseth to be profitable to the Common-wealth, then it altogether ceaseth to be a Law, and is not obligatory (But this I have elsewhere fullier opened) And as to the question in hand [Haec cura populi & potestas super illum licet omnis à Deo sit, illam tamen homines diversimode à Deo habent, non semper à Deo immediate, sed saepe per populi consensum, à quo primum Deo annuente aut permittente illam accepit; nec majorem quam illi populus ob initio concessit: tam aperta & manifesta est haec populi potestas, &c.] And so he goeth on to prove out of Zenophon, Julian, Jurisc. the Canon Law, &c. that the community is quoddam totum liberum habens jus naturaliter regendi seipsum; ita hoc jus potest transferre in alium, & vices suas alteri delegare; and that Kings have been made by the people from the beginning, and from their consent the Governing power still cometh. And that [a Law not necessary by Gods making, made by a Lay Prince, the whole people contradicting, is of no
Yet more that the same Author addeth, p. 112. that as to […] power, though he that hath it be […] the Power immediately from God]. And how will he ever prove that Church Power is any more from God than the necessary part of Civil […]? Is not the ratio derivand[…] the same so far, that in both, the people do but choose the Receivers (and limit in the unnecessary parts) and God immediately give the power? The case is the same in both.
Yet more that the same Author addeth, p. 112. that as to 〈…〉 power, though he that hath it be 〈…〉 the Power immediately from God]. And how will he ever prove that Church Power is any more from God than the necessary part of Civil 〈…〉? Is not the ratio derivand〈…〉 the same so far, that in both, the people do but choose the Receivers (and limit in the unnecessary parts) and God immediately give the power? The case is the same in both.
As to the rest of the Papists doctrine, he knoweth nothing of them that knoweth not that commonly they make the King, not only dependant on the Pope, but more also on the Efficient Power and will of the people than most Protestants do; where there is in this any difference, the Papists are the more popular.
And for Protestants I will not meddle with Divines but Lawyers, School Doctors and Politic writers; who commonly go further for the peoples power than ever I or any Nonconfor•••s of my familiarity did approve (Pardon our singularity) I would desire no more of such as the […] and other accusers of our principles, but to read over […], and such others, yea the most powerful defenders of Monarchy, […], And then read the Protestant Lawyers and Doctors of Philosophy, and compare our principles here with the […].
And for Protestants I will not meddle with Divines but Lawyers, School Doctors and Politick writers; who commonly go further for the peoples power than ever I or any Nonconfor•••s of my familiarity did approve (Pardon our singularity) I would desire no more of such as the 〈…〉 and other accusers of our principles, but to read over 〈…〉, and such others, yea the most powerful defenders of Monarchy, 〈…〉, And then read the Protestant Lawyers and Doctors of Philosophy, and compare our principles here with the 〈…〉.
I will pass by such as Learned […], and now instance only in […] a Lawyer. In his Politics (I will not English it) he saith in […] (most like Mr. H[…]oker) [A[…]sero ⟨p. 121⟩haec jura Majestatis, quae dicuntur, regno adeo esse propria, ut soli haec competant, ejusque spiritus vitalis, anima, cor & vita sint, quibus salvis Resp. vivit; & quibus sublatis interit & perit illa, nomineque hoc indigna judicanda. Concedo horum jurium Principem seu summum Magistratum esse dispensatorem, administratorem vel procuratorem: Proprietatem vero illorum & usumfructum adeo jure ad regnum seu populum universum pertinere contendo, ut hunc etiamsi velit see abdicare, eaque in alium transfer & alienare, nequaquam possit, non minus quam vitam quam quisque habet, alii communicare potest. Jura haec à populo seu membris Regni & Reip. constituta sunt; ab illis inceperunt, atque non nisi in illis consistere possunt, & ab illis conservari. Horum quoque administratio quae principi est precario seu expacto concessa, illo mortuo ad populum, qui ob perpetuam successionem immortalis dicitur, revertitur, & alii ab eodem demandatur, cujus unus vel plures capaces esse possint.
I will pass by such as Learned 〈…〉, and now instance only in 〈…〉 a Lawyer. In his Politicks (I will not English it) he saith in 〈…〉 (most like Mr. H〈…〉oker) [A〈…〉sero ⟨p. 121⟩haec jura Majestatis, quae dicuntur, regno adeo esse propria, ut soli haec competant, ejusque spiritus vitalis, anima, cor & vita sint, quibus salvis Resp. vivit; & quibus sublatis interit & perit illa, nomineque hoc indigna judicanda. Concedo horum jurium Principem seu summum Magistratum esse dispensatorem, administratorem vel procuratorem: Proprietatem vero illorum & usumfructum adeo jure ad regnum seu populum universum pertinere contendo, ut hunc etiamsi velit se abdicare, eaque in alium transferre & alienare, nequaquam possit, non minus quam vitam quam quisque habet, alii communicare potest. Jura haec à populo seu membris Regni & Reip. constituta sunt; ab illis inceperunt, atque non nisi in illis consistere possunt, & ab illis conservari. Horum quoque administratio quae principi est precario seu expacto concessa, illo mortuo ad populum, qui ob perpetuam successionem immortalis dicitur, revertitur, & alii ab eodem demandatur, cujus unus vel plures capaces esse possint.
Et Cap. 14. de Ephoris he copiously asserteth that these Ephori or Patriciu, seniors, principes, status, primores regni, are the peoples trustees, above the chief Magistrate, as All conjunct representing the people, but singly his inferiors (p. 142.) and what they do, the people doth, p. 139. Chosen to make the chief Magistrate, and to keep him within his limits, p. 141. To be his Counsel in greatest matters, yea to judge whether the chief Magistrate perform his office, and to resist and hinder his Tyranny. p. 146, 147. He layeth down eight reasons as to prove the right of these Optimates to resist Tyrants (I will not recite them) and by Scriptures and examples to confirm it; And then proceedeth to answer, 1. Who may and ought to resist the Magistrate, 2. What Magistrate may be resisted, 3. When, 4. How, 5. How far and how long. He applieth it, 1. To Tyrants absque titulo, ⟨p. 122⟩2. To Tyrants exercitio, (not all that are faulty but) by these notes described by him, Revera ille Tyrannus dicendus est qui malitiose & hostiliter & consulto data opera Remp. & Ecclesiam vastat, pervertit, turbat, cultum dei abolet vel profanat, vel quae dei sunt affectans sibi vendicat & usurpat.
Et Cap. 14. de Ephoris he copiously asserteth that these Ephori or Patriciu, seniores, principes, status, primores regni, are the peoples trustees, above the chief Magistrate, as All conjunct representing the people, but singly his inferiours (p. 142.) and what they do, the people doth, p. 139. Chosen to make the chief Magistrate, and to keep him within his limits, p. 141. To be his Councel in greatest matters, yea to judge whether the chief Magistrate perform his office, and to resist and hinder his Tyranny. p. 146, 147. He layeth down eight reasons as to prove the right of these Optimates to resist Tyrants (I will not recite them) and by Scriptures and examples to confirm it; And then proceedeth to answer, 1. Who may and ought to resist the Magistrate, 2. What Magistrate may be resisted, 3. When, 4. How, 5. How far and how long. He applyeth it, 1. To Tyrants absque titulo, ⟨p. 122⟩2. To Tyrants exercitio, (not all that are faulty but) by these notes described by him, Revera ille Tyrannus dicendus est qui malitiose & hostiliter & consulto data opera Remp. & Ecclesiam vastat, pervertit, turbat, cultum dei abolet vel profanat, vel quae dei sunt affectans sibi vendicat & usurpat.
