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The doctrine of the covenant of redemption. Wherein is laid the foundation of all…
The doctrine of the covenant of redemption. Wherein is laid the foundation of all our hopes and happiness. Briefly opened and improved. / By Samuel Willard, teacher of a church in Boston. ; [Three lines from Psalms]
Boston: printed by Benj. Harris over against the Old-Meeting-House, 1693
Chapter 10: The necessity of this Covenant, in order to Mans Salvation.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3. That hence punishment is to be reckoned to Gods works of Efficiency, of which the Rule given by Divines is, Omne opus ad extra est Contingens. That all Gods Acts or Works out of himself are Contingent, as they are opposed to necessity of nature; i. e. they might have ⟨p. 74⟩been, or they might not have been. That they are voluntary acts of Choice, and depend on his Will. Whatsoever concerns any Second Being, was at Gods pleasure, as to his treating with it, and his Dispensations of himself unto it.
3. That hence punishment is to be reckoned to Gods works of E•f•ciency, of which the Rule given by Divines is, Omne opus ad extra est Contingens. That all Gods Acts or Works out of himself are Contingent, as they are opposed to necessity of nature; i. e. they might have ⟨p. 74⟩been, or they might not have been. That they are voluntary acts of Choise, and depend on his Will. Whatsoever concerns any Second Being, was at Gods pleasure, as to his treating with it, and his Dispensations of himself unto it.
4. Hence all the Works of Efficiency are the Executions of a Free, Decree, Eph. 1.11. It refers to all Gods Dispensations both of Creation and Providence: whatsoever God doth by necessity of nature, needed not to have past into a Decree. The Decree is acknowledged by all the Orthodox, to be a voluntary Deliberation and Determination of a most free agent, prescribing to himself an Idea or method for the order and way in which he will carry on those Affairs he intends to manage, and although there is a sort of freedom which is consistent with necessity; yet a thing cannot be both naturally necessary, and yet arbitrary, because these two are contradistinct.