N00556:25
The doctrine of the covenant of redemption. Wherein is laid the foundation of all…
The doctrine of the covenant of redemption. Wherein is laid the foundation of all our hopes and happiness. Briefly opened and improved. / By Samuel Willard, teacher of a church in Boston. ; [Three lines from Psalms]
Boston: printed by Benj. Harris over against the Old-Meeting-House, 1693
Chapter 2: The right Notion of the Covenant of Redemption Stated,
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
CHAPTER 2. The right Notion of the Covenant of Redemption Stated,
There are two enquiries apt to be made about a matter of Discourse, viz. Ansit, and Quidst, whether the thing be, and what it is. If the thing it self be taken for granted to be, the former is Superseded; but if it be Suspected, it must be Cleared: and either of these seems to claim the Precedency: for, though words be to signify things, yet they are often Dark, Ambiguous Aequivial; and till we know what they Indigitate, how shall we determine whether the thing be? And yet on the other hand, till we are satisfied that the thing is, it is superfluous to enquire into the nature of it, lest our dispute ⟨p. 6⟩should prove to be about a non-entity. To avoid both of these, I shall here only give some brief general account of the thing intended by the Covenant of Redemption, in order to the proof of the Assertion that there is such a thing; leaving the full explanation of it till afterwards.
THere are two enquiries apt to be made about a matter of Discourse, viz. Ansit, and Quids•t, whether the thing be, and what it is. If the thing it self be taken for granted to be, the former is Superseded; but if it be Suspected, it must be Cleared: and either of these seems to claim the Precedency: for, though words be to signify things, yet they are often Dark, Ambiguous Aequivial; and till we know what they Indigitate, how shall we determine whether the thing be? And yet on the other hand, till we are satisfied that the thing is, it is superfluous to enquire into the nature of it, lest our dispute ⟨p. 6⟩