N02384:1869
A complete body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the…A compleat body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the…
A complete body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the Assembly's Shorter catechism wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are unfolded, their truth confirmed, their excellence displayed, their usefulness improved; contrary errors & vices refuted & exposed, objections answered, controversies settled, cases of conscience resolved; and a great light thereby reflected on the present age. / By the Reverend & learned Samuel Willard, M.A. late Pastor of the South Church in Boston, and vice-president of Harvard College in Cambridge, in New-England. ; Prefaced by the pastors of the same church. ; [Six lines of Scripture texts]A compleat body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the Assembly's Shorter catechism wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are unfolded, their truth confirm'd, their excellence display'd, their usefulness improv'd; contrary errors & vices refuted & expos'd, objections answer'd, controversies settled, cases of conscience resolv'd; and a great light thereby reflected on the present age. / By the Reverend & learned Samuel Willard, M.A. late Pastor of the South Church in Boston, and vice-president of Harvard College in Cambridge, in New-England. ; Prefac'd by the pastors of the same church. ; [Six lines of Scripture texts]
printed by B. Green and S. Kneeland for B. Eliot and D. Henchman, 1726
AN EXPOSITION OF THE ASSEMBLY's SHORTER CATECHISM: IN Two Hundred a… › Sermon 71 (Question 20 cont.)
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
BUT, for a more particular and distinct clearing up of this matter, I shall endeavour a little to explicate the meaning of it; and then to give some instances, wherein it will appear. Here then it is necessary that we do in God distinguish of his acts, of which some are natural, some voluntary: for without o•• so distinguishing, our manner of conception about him, must needs be confused: it is true, all God's natural acts, are in a sense voluntary; for he is the most free agent, and his will is himself […] but yet all God's voluntary acts are not natural: for though he doth nothing but what is agreeable to his nature, yet he doth many things, which it had been no way repugnant to his nature if he had ••t done them, or done otherwise. Now, between these two sorts of acts, there are these differences observable.
BUT, for a more particular and distinct clearing up of this matter, I shall endeavour a little to explicate the meaning of it; and then to give some instances, wherein it will appear. Here then it is necessary that we do in God distinguish of his acts, of which some are natural, some voluntary: for without o•• so distinguishing, our manner of conception about him, must needs be confused: it is true, all God's natural acts, are in a sense voluntary; for he is the most free agent, and his will is himself 〈…〉 but yet all God's voluntary acts are not natural: for though he doth nothing but what is agreable to his nature, yet he doth many things, which it had been no way repugnant to his nature if he had ••t done them, or done otherwise. Now, between these two sorts of acts, there are these differences observable.
1. THE sort are necessary; the latter […] at liberty and consequently contingent. It is true, there is a necessity well enough consistent with a freedom of will; natural anxious, in a rational Agent may be spontaneous; but there is a necessity, and liberty, which are things repugnant: things naturally necessary are determined to one, and may not vary; things of liberty are indifferent, a oppsita, so that they may, or may not do. God can or but be himself; he cannot deny himself; he is a God of truth, and he cannot e: the Father cannot but eternally beget the Son, &c. And this necessity is absolute, it is impossible that he should do other: but then, he might, or might not have willed to make a world, or to have made it that; or put these and those creatures into it. It is true, upon the supposition that he wills it us be so, there is an hypothetical necessity that it must be; because his will is not capable of changes, but yet it was arbitrary with […] whether he would have thus willed. H that,