A complete body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the…A compleat body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the…

II. IT is required in a Rule that it be Full. Every Rule ought to be perfect in its kind and that wherein its perfection doth mainly consist, is that it be adequate to the Art or Science which it teacheth. It is not an universal perfection that we are here considering, but particular. A thing is then perfect in its kind, when it answers fully to the end that it is to serve to: there are several Arts in the world, & every one hath it's distinct design; the Rule belonging to it, is that whereby that Praxis may be rightly performed; and it is then perfect, when there is nothing wanting in it, which belongs to the doctrine of such an Art, tho' it have nothing in it belonging to the doctrine of another Science. That every Rule ought thus to be full or perfect, will appear if we consider, 1. THAT the Rule is our proper directory by which we are to be guided in our Operation. Hence there can be no perfect Operation, without a perfect Rule: the Rule is that which points out the way to the end; and if in any one step of it, that fail to give us direction, it leaves us at a loss, it either makes us to stand still, or exposeth us to mistakes; for where our Rule leave us, there we are in a labyrinth without a clue to lead us out: and that is one great reason of the vanity of humane Sciences, because of the conjectural & imperfect Rules that man have to follow in the practice of them. 2. THAT the Rule is that by which only the Actions can be tried. If a man would know whether his work be right, he must apply the Rule to it, and it is just so far approvable as it is commensurate with it; if then it be not perfect, it will not be fit to weigh all Actions by; and consequently there would be some of which no judgment could be made; and it cannot be known whether it be worthy of praise or blame• or whether it be leading to or diverting from the end. 3. THAT all imperfection is a coming short of the Rule. This is the proper notion of a thing that is imperfect, for that which in all points answers its Rule, and in nothing comes short of it, is a perfect work; if therefore the Rule should be imperfect, it would be irregular, and what greater contradiction than this?

II. IT is required in a Rule that it be Full. Every Rule ought to be perfect in its kind and that wherein its perfection doth mainly consist, is that it be adequate to the Art or Science which it teacheth. It is not an universal perfection that we are here considering, but particular. A thing is then perfect in its kind, when it answers fully to the end that it is to serve to: there are several Arts in the world, & every one hath it's distinct design; the Rule belonging to it, is that whereby that Praxis may be rightly performed; and it is then perfect, when there is nothing wanting in it, which belongs to the doctrine of such an Art, tho' it have nothing in it belonging to the doctrine of another Science. That every Rule ought thus to be full or perfect, will appear if we consider, 1. THAT the Rule is our proper directory by which we are to be guided in our Operation. Hence there can be no perfect Operation, without a perfect Rule: the Rule is that which points out the way to the end; and if in any one step of it, that fail to give us direction, it leaves us at a loss, it either makes us to stand still, or exposeth us to mistakes; for where our Rule leave us, there we are in a labyrinth without a clue to lead us out: and that is one great reason of the vanity of humane Sciences, because of the conjectural & imperfect Rules that man have to follow in the practice of them. 2. THAT the Rule is that by which only the Actions can be tryed. If a man would know whether his work be right, he must apply the Rule to it, and it is just so far approveable as it is commenserate with it; if then it be not perfect, it will not be fit to weigh all Actions by; and consequently there would be some of which no judgment could be made; and it cannot be known whether it be worthy of praise or blame or whether it be leading to or diverting from the end. 3. THAT all imperfection is a coming short of the Rule. This is the proper notion of a thing that is imperfect, for that which in all points answers its Rule, and in nothing comes short of it, is a perfect work; if therefore the Rule should be imperfect, it would be irregular, and what greater contradiction than this?