N02384:4562
A complete body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the…A compleat body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the…
A complete body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the Assembly's Shorter catechism wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are unfolded, their truth confirmed, their excellence displayed, their usefulness improved; contrary errors & vices refuted & exposed, objections answered, controversies settled, cases of conscience resolved; and a great light thereby reflected on the present age. / By the Reverend & learned Samuel Willard, M.A. late Pastor of the South Church in Boston, and vice-president of Harvard College in Cambridge, in New-England. ; Prefaced by the pastors of the same church. ; [Six lines of Scripture texts]A compleat body of divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the Assembly's Shorter catechism wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are unfolded, their truth confirm'd, their excellence display'd, their usefulness improv'd; contrary errors & vices refuted & expos'd, objections answer'd, controversies settled, cases of conscience resolv'd; and a great light thereby reflected on the present age. / By the Reverend & learned Samuel Willard, M.A. late Pastor of the South Church in Boston, and vice-president of Harvard College in Cambridge, in New-England. ; Prefac'd by the pastors of the same church. ; [Six lines of Scripture texts]
printed by B. Green and S. Kneeland for B. Eliot and D. Henchman, 1726
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
AS to that controverted Question. Whether Civil Rulers have a power to make Laws about Things indifferent? I shall only say thus in general, viz. That we must distinguish between Power as it respects the Submission due from the Subject, and as it is under the Divine Ordinance and Regulation: We must also distinguish between a thing Indifferent in it self, and in it's Circumstances: And then it may easily be resolved, that God hath given Civil Rulers Authority to make no other Laws, than are for the Good of the Government, so that if they Enact any other, they Transgress their Commission from God, and are accountable to Him for it; and do not carry it as Fathers to their People. And though in a Moral sense, there are things which themselves are of a middle Nature, and Man is at liberty either to do them, or avoid them; and in that sense they are neither Good nor Evil, and so they cannot be the proper Matter of a Law, it being essential to a good Law, that it be for the Good of those for whom it is made; and to limit the Subject in things lawful in themselves, merely pro Arbitrio, is Oppression. But these things may be clothed with such Circumstances as may render them either hurtful or beneficial to Men, and so they will become either a Duty or a Sin; and it will be very proper to make Laws about them accordingly, which may be for the Public Good. And doubtless, there are no Laws more necessary for the bene esse of a People, than such as put a Restraint upon the sinful abuse of Lawful Liberties.
AS to that controverted Question. Whether Civil Rulers have a power to make Laws about Things indifferent? I shall only say thus in general, viz. That we must distinguish between Power as it respects the Submission due from the Subject, and as it is under the Divine Ordinance and Regulation: We must also distinguish between a thing Indifferent in it self, and in it's Circumstances: And then it may easily be resolved, that God hath given Civil Rulers Authority to make no other Laws, than are for the Good of the Government, so that if they Enact any other, they Transgress their Commission from God, and are accountable to Him for it; and do not carry it as Fathers to their People. And though in a Moral sense, there are things which themselves are of a middle Nature, and Man is at liberty either to do them, or avoid them; and in that sense they are neither Good nor Evil, and so they cannot be the proper Matter of a Law, it being essential to a good Law, that it be for the Good of those for whom it is made; and to limit the Subject in things lawful in themselves, meerly pro Arbitrio, is Oppression. But these things may be cloathed with such Circumstances as may render them either hurtful or beneficial to Men, and so they will become either a Duty or a Sin; and it will be very proper to make Laws about them accordingly, which may be for the Publick Good. And doubtless, there are no Laws more necessary for the bene esse of a People, than such as put a Restraint upon the sinful abuse of Lawful Liberties.