N03467:449
Discourses on various important subjects, nearly concerning the great affair of the soul's eternal…
Discourses on various important subjects, nearly concerning the great affair of the soul's eternal salvation, viz. I. Justification by faith alone. II. Pressing into the Kingdom of God. III. Ruth's resolution. IV. The justice of God in the damnation of sinners. V. The excellency of Jesus Christ. : Delivered at Northampton, chiefly at the time of the late wonderful pouring out of the spirit of God there. / By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the Church of Christ in Northampton. ; [Three lines from Deuteronomy]
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1738
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Discourse 4: The Justice of GOD in the Damnation of Sinners.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If it be said that God need not have interposed to render it impossible for Man to sin, and yet not leave it to mere Contingence, or blind Chance, neither; but might have left it with Man's free Will, to determine whether to sin or no: I answer, If God did leave it to Man's free Will, without any Sort of Disposal, or Ordering in the Case, whence it should be previously certain how that •ree Will should determine, then still that first Determination of the Will, must be merely Contingent or by Chance. It could not have any antecedent Act of the Will to determine it; for I speak now of the very first Act or Motion of the Will, respecting the Affair that may be looked upon as the prime Ground, and highest Source of the Event. To suppose this to be determined by a foregoing Act is a Contradiction. God's […] this Determination of the Will, by his Permission, […] at all infringe the liberty of the Creature 'Tis […] Respect any more inconsistent with Liberty, ⟨p. 203⟩than mere Chance or Contingence. For if the Determination of the Will, be from blind, undesigning Chance, 'tis no m••• from the Agent himself, or from the Will it self, than if we suppose, in the Case, a wise, divine Disposal by Permission.
If it be said that God need not have interposed to render it impossible for Man to sin, and yet not leave it to meer Contingence, or blind Chance, neither; but might have left it with Man's free Will, to determine whether to sin or no: I answer, If God did leave it to Man's free Will, without any Sort of Disposal, or Ordering in the Case, whence it should be previously certain how that •ree Will should determine, then still that first Determination of the Will, must be meerly Contingent or by Chance. It could not have any antecedent Act of the Will to determine it; for I speak now of the very first Act or Motion of the Will, respecting the Affair that may be looked upon as the prime Ground, and highest Source of the Event. To suppose this to be determined by a foregoing Act is a Contradiction. God's 〈…〉 this Determination of the Will, by his Permission, 〈…〉 at all infringe the liberty of the Creature 'Tis 〈…〉 Respect any more inconsistent with Liberty,