N04635:445
A Treatise concerning Religious Affections
A treatise concerning religious affections, in three parts. Part I. Concerning the nature of the affections, and their importance in religion. Part II. Showing what are no certain signs that religious affections are gracious, or that they are not. Part III. Showing what are distinguishing signs of truly gracious and holy affections. / By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. and Pastor of the First Church in Northampton. ; [Eleven lines of Scripture texts]A treatise concerning religious affections, in three parts. Part I. Concerning the nature of the affections, and their importance in religion. Part II. Shewing what are no certain signs that religious affections are gracious, or that they are not. Part III. Shewing what are distinguishing signs of truly gracious and holy affections. / By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. and Pastor of the First Church in Northampton. ; [Eleven lines of Scripture texts]
Boston: printed for S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1746
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
There is such a Thing as good Taste of natural Beauty, (which learned Men often speak of) that is exercised about temporal Things, in judging of them; as about the Justness of a Speech, the Goodness of Style, the Beauty of a Poem, the Gracefulness of Deportment, &c. A late great Philosopher of our Nation, writes thus upon it;‖. To have a Taste, is to give Things their real Value, to be touched with the Good, to be shocked with the Ill; not to be dazzled with false Lustres, but in Spite of all Colours, and every Thing that might deceive or amuse, to judge soundly. Taste and Judgment then, should be the same Thing; and yet 'tis easy to discern a Difference. The Judgment forms it's Opinions from Reflection: The Reason on this Occasion fetches a Kind of Circuit, to arrive at it's End; it supposes Principles, it draws Consequences, and it judges; but not without a thorough Knowledge of the Case; so that after it has pronounced, it is ready to render a Reason of it's Decrees. Good Taste observes none of these Formalities; ere it has Time to consult, it has taken it's Side; as soon as ever the Object is presented it, the Impression is made, the Sentiment formed, ask no more of it. As the Ear is wounded with a harsh Sound, as the Smell is soothed with an agreeable Odour, before ever the Reason have meddled with those Objects to judge of them, so the Taste opens itself at once, and prevents all Reflection. They may come afterwards to confirm it, and discover the secret Reasons of it's Conduct; but it was not in it's Power to wait for them. Frequently it happens not to know them at all, and what Pains soever it uses, cannot discover what it was determined it to think as it did. This Conduct is very different from That the ⟨p. 174⟩Judgment observes in it's Decisions: Unless we choose to say, that good Taste is as it were a first Motion, or a Kind of Instinct of right Reason, which hurries on with Rapidi••, and conducts more securely, that all the Reasonings she could make: 'Tis a first Glance of the Eye, which discovers to us the Nature and Relations of Things in a Moment.
There is such a Thing as good Taste of natural Beauty, (which learned Men often speak of) that is exercised about temporal Things, in judging of them; as about the Justness of a Speech, the Goodness of Style, the Beauty of a Poem, the Gracefulness of Deportment, &c. A late great Philosopher of our Nation, writes thus upon it;