Misrepresentations corrected, and truth vindicated. In a reply to the Rev. Mr. Solomon Williams's…

This Passage I took Notice of in my Book, where I say, I would humbly inquire, How those visible Qualifications can be the Ground of a rational Judgment, that a Person is circumcised in Heart, which nevertheless at the same Time, we are sensible, are so far from being probable Signs of it, that they are more frequently without it, than with it, &c. This seems to be a terrible Thing in Mr. Williams's Way, which he strikes at from Time to Time; and is an Impediment he boggles at exceedingly. One while he pretends, he can give a sufficient Answer: (P. 7, 8.) At another Time he pretends, that I remove the Difficulty my self: (P. 12.) Then again, in the same Page, he pretends to solve the Difficulty; and then in the next Page pretends, that if the Case be as I say, That we can't form a rational Judgment that a Thing is, which at the same Time, and under that Degree we then stand in, it's more probable is a mistaken one, than not, yet it can argue Nothing to the Case; seeing the Judgment we do form, is directed by a Rule which is appointed for us. But still as if not satisfied with these Answers & Remarks, he seems afterward to suggest, that Mr. S did not express this as his own Sentiment, but as Mr. Cotton's, as a Gentleman of the same Principles with Mr. Mather, using it as Argumentum ad Hominem. (See P. 33.)

This Passage I took Notice of in my Book, where I say, I would humbly inquire, How those visible Qualifications can be the Ground of a rational Judgment, that a Person is circumcised in Heart, which nevertheless at the same Time, we are sensible, are so far from being probable Signs of it, that they are more frequently without it, than with it, &c. This seems to be a terrible Thing in Mr. VVilliams's Way, which he strikes at from Time to Time; and is an Impediment he boggles at exceedingly. One while he pretends, he can give a sufficient Answer: (P. 7, 8.) At another Time he pretends, that I remove the Difficulty my self: (P. 12.) Then again, in the same Page, he pretends to solve the Difficulty; and then in the next Page pretends, that if the Case be as I say, That we can't form a rational Judgment that a Thing is, which at the same Time, and under that Degree we then stand in, it's more probable is a mistaken one, than not, yet it can argue Nothing to the Case; seeing the Judgment we do form, is directed by a Rule which is appointed for us. But still as if not satisfied with these Answers & Remarks, he seems afterward to suggest, that Mr. S did not express this as his own Sentiment, but as Mr. Cotton's, as a Gentleman of the same Principles with Mr. Mather, using it as Argumentum ad Hominem. (See P. 33.)