N05663:123
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 2 › Section 2: Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing Reasoning, considered.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Secondly, If a Power of Will determines the Act of the Will, then a Power of Choosing determines it. For, as was before observed, in every Act of Will, there is Choice, and a Power o• Willing is a Power of Choosing. But if a Power of Choosing determines the Act of Volition, it determines it by choosing it. For 'tis most absurd to say, that a Power of Choosing determines one Thing rather than another, without choosing any Thing. But if a Power of Choosing determines Volition by choosing it, then here is the Act of Volition determined by an antecedent Choice, choosing that Volition.
Secondly, If a Power of Will determines the Act of the Will, then a Power of Chusing determines it. For, as was before observed, in every Act of Will, there is Choice, and a Power o• Willing is a Power of Chusing. But if a Power of Chusing determines the Act of Volition, it determines it by chusing it. For 'tis most absurd to say, that a Power of Chusing determines one Thing rather than another, without chusing any Thing. But if a Power of Chusing determines Volition by chusing it, then here is the Act of Volition determined by an antecedent Choice, chusing that Volition.
Thirdly, To say, the Faculty, or the Soul, determines it's own Volition, but not by any Act, is a Contradiction. Because for the Soul to direct, decide, or determine any Thing, is to act; and this is supposed; for the Soul is here spoken of as being a Cause in this Affair, bringing something to pass, or doing something; or, which is the same Thing, exer•ing it self in order to an Effect, which Effect is the Determination of Volition, or the particular Kind and Manner of an Act of Will. But certain•y, this Exertion or Action is not the same with the Effect, in order to the Production of which it is exerted; but must be something prior to it.
Thirdly, To say, the Faculty, or the Soul, determines it's own Volition, but not by any Act, is a Contradiction. Because for the Soul to direct, decide, or determine any Thing, is to act; and this is supposed; for the Soul is here spoken of as being a Cause in this Affair, bringing something to pass, or doing something; or, which is the same Thing, exering it self in order to an Effect, which Effect is the Determination of Voliton, or the particular Kind and Manner of an Act of Will. But certainy, this Exertion or Action is not the same with the Effect, in order to the Production of which it is exerted; but must be something prior to it.