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A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 2 › Section 2: Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing Reasoning, considered.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, If the Will determines it self, then either the Will i• active in determining it's Volitions, or it is not. If it be active in it, then the Determination is an Act of the Will; and so there is one Act o• the Will determining another. But if the Will is not active in the Determination, then how ⟨p. 37⟩does it exercise any Liberty in it? These Gentlemen suppose that the Thing wherein the Will exercises Liberty, is in it's determining it's own Acts. But how can this be, if it be not active in determining? Certainly the Will, or the Soul, can't exercise any Liberty in that wherein it don't act, or wherein it don't exercise it self. So that if either Part of this Dilemma be taken, this Scheme of Liberty, consisting in Self-determining Power, is overthrown. If there be an Act of the Will in determining all it's own free Acts, then one free Act of the Will is determined by another; and so we have the Absurdity of every free Act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free Act. But if there be no Act or Exercise of the Will in determining it's own Acts, then no Liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that no Liberty consists in the Will's Power to determine it's own Acts: Or, which is the same Thing, that there is no such Thing as Liberty consisting in a Self-determining Power of the Will.
Again, If the Will determines it self, then either the Will i• active in determining it's Volitions, or it is not. If it be active in it, then the Determination is an Act of the Will; and so there is one Act o• the Will determining another. But if the Will is not acti•e in the Determination, then how ⟨p. 37⟩does it exercise any Liberty in it? These Gentlemen suppose that the Thing wherein the Will exercises Liberty, is in it's determining it's own Acts. But how can this be, if it ben't active in determining? Certainly the Will, or the Soul, can't exercise any Liberty in that wherein it don't act, or wherein it don't exercise it self. So that if either Part of this Dilemma be taken, this Scheme of Liberty, consisting in Self-determining Power, is overthrown. If there be an Act of the Will in determining all it's own free Acts, then one free Act of the Will is determined by another; and so we have the Absurdity of every free Act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free Act. But if there be no Act or Exercise of the Will in determining it's own Acts, then no Liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that no Liberty consists in the Will's Power to determine it's own Acts: Or, which is the same Thing, that there is no such Thing as Liberty consisting in a Self-determining Power of the Will.