A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

1. The very Supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows it self. For the Thing supposed, wherein this grand Argument consists, is, That among several Things the Will actually chooses one before another, at the same Time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very same Thing as to say, the Mind has a Preference, at the same Time that it has no Preference. What is meant can't be, that the Mind is indifferent before it comes to have a Choice, or 'till it has a Preference; or, which is the same Thing, that the Mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent. For certainly this Author did not suppose he had a Controversy with any Person in supposing this. And then it is Nothing to his Purpose, that the Mind which chooses, was indifferent once; unless it chooses, remaining indifferent; for otherwise, it don't choose at all in that Case of Indifference, concerning which is all the Question. Besides, it appears in Fact, that the Thing which this Author supposes, is not that the Will chooses one Thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chooses; but also is indifferent when it chooses; and that it's being otherwise than indifferent is not 'till afterwards, in Consequence of it's Choice; that the chosen Thing's appearing preferable and more agreeable than another, arises from it's Choice already made. His Words are (P. 30.) Where the Objects ⟨p. 57⟩which are proposed, appear equally fit or good, the Will is left without a Guide or Director; and therefore must make it's own Choice, by it's own Determination; it being properly a Self-determining Power. And in suc• Cases the Will does as it were make a Good to it self by it's own Choice, i. e. creates it's own Pleasure or Delight in this Self-chosen Good. Even as a Man by sei••ng upon a Spot of unoccupied Land, in an uninhabited Country, makes it his own Possession and Property, and as such rejoices in it. Where Things were indifferent before, the Will finds Nothing to make them more agreeable, considered merely in themselves; but the Pleasure it feels ARISING FROM IT'S OWN CHOICE, and it's Perseverance therein. We love many Things which we have chosen, AND PURELY BECAUSE WE CHOSE THEM.

1. The very Supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows it self. For the Thing supposed, wherein this grand Argument consists, is, That among several Things the Will actually chuses one before another, at the same Time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very same Thing as to say, the Mind has a Preference, at the same Time that it has no Preference. What is meant can't be, that the Mind is indifferent before it comes to have a Choice, or 'till it has a Preference; or, which is the same Thing, that the Mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent. For certainly this Author did not suppose he had a Controversy with any Person in supposing this. And then it is Nothing to his Purpose, that the Mind which chuses, was indifferent once; unless it chuses, remaining indifferent; for otherwise, it don't chuse at all in that Case of Indifference, concerning which is all the Question. Besides, it appears in Fact, that the Thing which this Author supposes, is not that the Will chuses one Thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chuses; but also is indifferent when it chuses; and that it's being otherwise than indifferent is not 'till afterwards, in Consequence of it's Choice; that the chosen Thing's appearing preferable and more agreable than another, arises from it's Choice already made. His Words are (P. 30.) Where the Objects