A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

This Author says, P. 36. The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the Will may determine it self to choose one or the other. And again in the same Page, I am entirely indifferent to either; and yet my Will may determine it self to choose. And again, Which I shall choose must be determined by the mere Act of my Will. If the Choice is determined by a mere Act of Will, then the Choice is determined by a mere Act of Choice. And concerning this Matter, viz. that the Act of the Will it self is determined by an Act of Choice, this Writer is express, in P. 72. Speaking of the Case, where there is no superior Fitness in Objects presented, he has these Words: There it must act by it's own CHOICE, and determine it self as it PLEASES. Where it is supposed that the very Determination, ⟨p. 58⟩which is the Ground and Spring of the Will's Act, is an Act of Choice and Pleasure, wherein one Act is more agreeable, and the Mind better pleased in it than another; and this Preference, and superior Pleasedness is the Ground of all it does in the Case. And if so, the Mind is not indifferent when it determines it self, but had rather do one Thing than another, had rather determine it self one Way than another. And therefore the Will don't act at all in Indifference; not so much as in the first Step it takes, or the first Rise and Beginning of it's acting. If it be possible for the Understanding to act in Indifference, yet to be sure the Will never does; because the Will's beginning to act is the very same Thing as it's beginning to choose or pr•fer. And if in the very first Act of the Will, the Mind prefers something, then the Idea of that Thing preferred, does at that Time preponderate, or prevail in the Mind; or, which is the same Thing, the Idea of it has a prevailing Influence on the Will. So that this wholly destroys the Thing supposed, viz. That the Mind can by a sovereign Power choose one of two or more Things, which in the View of the Mind are, in every Respect, perfectly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing Influence on the Mind above another.

This Author says, P. 36. The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the Will may determine it self to chuse one or the other. And again in the same Page, I am entirely indifferent to either; and yet my Will may determine it self to chuse. And again, Which I shall chuse must be determined by the meer Act of my Will. If the Choice is determined by a meer Act of Will, then the Choice is determined by a meer Act of Choice. And concerning this Matter, viz. that the Act of the Will it self is determined by an Act of Choice, this Writer is express, in P. 72. Speaking of the Case, where there is no superiour Fitness in Objects presented, he has these Words: There it must act by it's own CHOICE, and determine it self as it PLEASES. Where it is supposed that the very Determination,