A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

So that this Author, in his grand Argument for the Ability of the Will to choose one of two, or more Things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same Time, in Effect, deny the Thing he supposes, and allows and asserts the Point he endeavours to ov•••hrow; even that the Will, in choosing, is subject to no prevailing Influence of the Idea, or View of the Thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this Argument without overthrowing it; the Thing supposed in it being inconsistent with it self, and that which denies it self. To suppose the Will to act at all in a State of perfect Indifference, either to determine it self, or to do any Thing else, is to assert that the Mind chooses without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow it's Pleasure, when it has no Pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any Difficulty in the Instances of two Cakes, or two Eggs &c. which are exactly alike, one as good as another; concerning which this Author supposes the Mind in Fact has a Choice, and so in Effect supposes that it has a Preference; i• as much concerned Himself to solve the Difficulty, as it does those whom he opposes. For if these Instances prove ⟨p. 59⟩any Thing to his Purpose, they prove that a Man chooses without Choice. And yet this is not to his Purpose; because if this is what he asserts, his own Words are as much against him, and do as much contradict him, as the Words of those he disputes against can do.

So that this Author, in his grand Argument for the Ability of the Will to chuse one of two, or more Things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same Time, in Effect, deny the Thing he supposes, and allows and asserts the Point he endeavours to ov•••hrow; even that the Will, in chusing, is subject to no prevailing Influence of the Idea, or View of the Thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this Argument without overthrowing it; the Thing supposed in it being inconsistent with it self, and that which denies it self. To suppose the Will to act at all in a State of perfect Indifference, either to determine it self, or to do any Thing else, is to assert that the Mind chuses without chusing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow it's Pleasure, when it has no Pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any Difficulty in the Instances of two Cakes, or two Eggs &c. which are exactly alike, one as good as another; concrning which this Author supposes the Mind in Fact has a Choice, and so in Effect supposes that it has a Preference; i as much concern'd Himself to solve the Difficulty, as it does those whom he opposes. For if these Instances prove