N05663:189
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 2 › Section 7: Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And here I would observe in the first Place, that to make out this Scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect and absolute; there must be a perfect Freedom from all antecedent Preponderation or Inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts it's own sovereign Power on it self, then it's Inclination is not wholly owing to it self: If when two Opposites are proposed to the Soul for it's Choice, the Proposal don't find the Soul wholly in a State of Indifference, then it is not found in a State of Liberty for mere Self-determination. — The least Degree of antecedent Bias must be inconsistent with their Notion of Liberty. For so long as prior Inclination possesses the Will, and is not removed, it binds the Will, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act otherwise than agreeably to it. Surely the Will can't act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing Inclination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same Thing as to suppose, that the Will is inclined contrary to it's present prevailing Inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will chooses and prefers, that, all Things considered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impossible for the Will to choose contrary to it's own remaining and present preponderating Inclination, as 'tis to prefer contrary to it's own present Preference, or choose contrary to it's own present Choice. The Will therefore, so long as it is under the Influence of an old preponderating Inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free Act, or any Act that shall now be an Act of Self-determination. The Act which is a Self-determined free Act, must be an Act which the Will determines in the Possession and Use of such a Liberty, as consists in a Freedom from every Thing, which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the Will, at that Time, should be otherwise th•n that Way to which it tends.
And here I would observe in the first Place, that to make out this Scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect and abs•lute; there must be a perfect Freedom from all antecedent Preponderation or Inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts it's own sovereign Power on it self, then it's Inclination is not wholly owing to it self: If when two Opposites are proposed to the Soul for it's Choice, the Proposal don't find the Soul wholly in a State of Indifference, then it is not found in a State of Liberty for meer Self-determination. — The least Degree of antecedent Bias must be inconsistent with their Notion of Liberty. For so long as prior Inclination possesses the Will, and is not removed, it binds the Will, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act otherwise than agreably to it. Surely the Will can't act or chuse contrary to a remaining prevailing Inclination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same Thing as to suppose, that the Will is inclined contrary to it's present prevailing Inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will chuses and prefers, that, all Things considered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impossible for the Will to chuse contrary to it's own remaining and present preponderating Inclination, as 'tis to prefer contrary to it's own present Preference, or chuse contrary to it's own present Choice. The Will therefore, so long as it is under the Influence of an old preponderating Inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free Act, or any Act that shall now be an Act of Self-determination. The Act which is a Self-determin'd free Act, must be an Act which the Will determines in the Possession and Use of such a Liberty, as consists in a Freedom from every Thing, which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the Will, at that Time, should be otherwise thn that Way to which it tends.