Mr. Locke says, †The Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire; which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary Tendency from that which our Wills set us upon. A Man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use Persuasions to another, which, at the same Time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this Case 'tis plain the Will and Desire run counter. I don't suppose, that Will and Desire are Words of precisely the same Signification: Will seems to be a Word of a more general Signification, extending to Things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present Situation and Posture, suppose sitting still, or having my Eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I can't think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A Man never, in any Instance, wills any Thing contrary to his Desires, or desires any Thing contrary to his Will. The forementioned Instance, which Mr. Locke produces, don't prove that he ever does. He may, on some Consideration or other, will to utter Speeches which have a Tendency ⟨p. 4⟩to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not persuade him: But yet his Will and Desire don't run counter at all: The Thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and he don't will a Thing, and desire the contrary in any Particular. In this Instance, it is not carefully observed, what is th• Thing willed, and what is the Thing desired: If it were, it would be found that Will and Desire don't clash in the least. The Thing willed on some Consideration, is to utter such Words; and certainly, the same Consideration so influences him, that he don't desire the contrary; all Things considered, he chooses to utter such Words, and don't desire not to utter 'em. And so as to the Thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz. that the Words, tho' They tend to persuade, should not be effectual to that End, his Will is not contrary to this; he don't will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same Thing, or with respect to the very same Object of Will or Desire: But here the Objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree.
Mr. Locke says, †The Will is perfectly distinguish'd from Desire; which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary Tendency from that which our Wills set us upon. A Man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use Perswasions to another, which, at the same Time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this Case 'tis plain the Will and Desire run counter. I don't suppose, that Will and Desire are Words of precisely the same Signification: Will seems to be a Word of a more general Signification, extending to Things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present Situation and Posture, suppose sitting still, or having my Eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I can't think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A Man never, in any Instance, wills any Thing contrary to his Desires, or desires any Thing contrary to his Will. The foremention'd Instance, which Mr. Locke produces, don't prove that he ever does. He may, on some Consideration or other, will to utter Speeches which have a Tendency ⟨p. 4⟩to perswade another, and still may desire that they may not perswade him: But yet his Will and Desire don't run counter at all: The Thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and he don't will a Thing, and desire the contrary in any Particular. In this Instance, it is not carefully observed, what is th• Thing will'd, and what is the Thing desired: If it were, it would be found that Will and Desire don't clash in the least. The Thing will'd on some Consideration, is to utter such Words; and certainly, the same Consideration so influences him, that he don't desire the contrary; all Things considered, he chuses to utter such Words, and don't desire not to utter 'em. And so as to the Thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz. that the Words, tho' They tend to perswade, should not be effectual to that End, his Will is not contrary to this; he don't will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same Thing, or with respect to the very same Object of Will or Desire: But here the Objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree.
- †Hum. Und. Vol. I. P. 203.204.
