A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an Act of the Will, but 'tis supposed to be the only free Act of the Will; because it is said, that this is the Thing wherein the Liberty of the Will consists.—Now if this be so, then this is all the Act of Will that we have to consider in this Controversy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our Enquiries, wherein the Liberty of Man consists. And now the forementioned Difficulties remain: the former Question returns upon us; viz. Wherein consists the Freedom of the Will in those Acts wherein it is free? And if this Act of determining a Suspension be the only Act in which the Will is free, then wherein consists the Will's Freedom with Respect to this Act of Suspension? And how is Indifference essential to this Act? The Answer must be, according to what is supposed in the evasion under Consideration, That the Liberty of the Will in this Act of Suspension, consists in a Power to suspend even this Act, 'till there has been Opportunity for thorough Deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest Nonsense: for 'tis the Act of Suspension it self that we are speaking of; and there is no Room for a Space of Deliberation and Suspension, in order to determine whether we will suspend or no. For that supposes, that even Suspension it self may be deferred: Which is absurd; for the very deferring the Determination of Suspension, to consider whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the Space of Suspension, to consider whether to suspend, the Act is ipso facto suspended. There is no Medium between suspending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no Possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one Moment; and so no Room for Deliberation before we do either of them.

2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an Act of the Will, but 'tis supposed to be the only free Act of the Will; because it is said, that this is the Thing wherein the Liberty of the Will consists.—Now if this be so, then this is all the Act of Will that we have to consider in this Controversy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our Enquiries, wherein the Liberty of Man consists. And now the forementioned Difficulties remain: the former Question returns upon us; viz. Wherein consists the Freedom of the Will in those Acts wherein it is free? And if this Act of determining a Suspension be the only Act in which the Will is free, then wherein consists the Will's Freedom with Respect to this Act of Suspension? And how is Indifference essential to this Act? The Answer must be, according to what is supposed in the •vasion under Consideration, That the Liberty of the Will in this Act of Suspension, consists in a Power to suspend even this Act, 'till there has been Opportunity for thorough Deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest Nonsense: for 'tis the Act of Suspension it self that we are speaking of; and there is no Room for a Space of Deliberation and Suspension, in order to determine whether we will suspend or no. For that supposes, that even Suspension it self may be defer'd: Which is absurd; for the very deferring the Determination of Suspension, to consider whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the Space of Suspension, to consider whether to suspend, the Act is ipso facto suspended. There is no Medium between suspending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no Possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one Moment; and so no Room for Deliberation before we do either of them.