N05663:242
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And yet at the same Time, by his Scheme, the Influence of Motives upon us to excite to Action, and to be actually a Ground of Volition, is consequent on the Volition or Choice of the Mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free Actions, before the Mind is the Subject of those Volitions which Motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses whether it will comply with the Motive, which presents it self in View, or not; and when various Motives are presented, it chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject. So P. 256. Every Man has Power to act, or to refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, any Motive that presents. P. 257. Every Man is at Liberty to act, or refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these Motives, considered singly, would excite him to.—Man has Power, and is as much at Liberty to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has Power, and is at Liberty to reject those Motives ⟨p. 86⟩that do not. And so P. 310, 311. In order to constitute a moral Agent, it is necessary, that he should have Power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon such moral Motives as he pleases. And to the like Purpose in many other Places. According to these Things, the Will acts first, and chooses or refuses to comply with the Motive that is presented, before it falls under it's prevailing Influence: And 'tis first determined by the Mind's Pleasure or Choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by them.
And yet at the same Time, by his Scheme, the Influence of Motives upon us to excite to Action, and to be actually a Ground of Volition, is consequent on the Volition or Choice of the Mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free Actions, before the Mind is the Subject of those Volitions which Motives excite, it chuses to be so. It chuses whether it will comply with the Motive, which presents it self in View, or not; and when various Motives are presented, it chuses which it will yield to, and which it will reject. So P. 256. Every Man has Power to act, or to refrain from acting agreably with, or contrary to, any Motive that presents. P. 257. Every Man is at Liberty to act, or refrain from acting agreably with, or contrary to, what each of these Motives, considered singly, would excite him to.—Man has Power, and is as much at Liberty to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has Power, and is at Liberty to reject those Motives ⟨p. 86⟩