A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

But these Things cannot stand together. — There is such a Thing as a Diversity of Strength in Motives to Choice, previous to the Choice it self. Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they do previously invite, induce, excite and dispose the Mind to Action. This implies, that they have something in themselves that is inviting, some Tendency to induce and dispose to Volition, previous to Volition it self. And if they have in themselves this Nature and Tendency, doubtless they have it in certain limited Degrees, which are capable of Diversity; and some have it in greater Degrees, others in less; and they that have most of this Tendency, considered with all their Nature and Circumstances, previous to Volition, they are the strongest Motives; and those that have least, are the weakest Motives.

Now if Volition sometimes don't follow the Motive which is strongest, or has most previous Tendency or Advantage, all Things considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakest, or that which as it stands previously in the Mind's View, has least Tendency to induce it; herein the Will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous Reason to dispose the Mind to it, contrary to what the sam• ⟨p. 90⟩Author supposes. The Act wherein the Will must proceed without previous Motive to induce it, is the Act of preferring the weakest Motive. For how absurd is it to say, The Mind sees previous Reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other; and at the same Time to suppose, that there is Nothing in the Motive, in it's Nature, State, or any Circumstances of it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous View of the Mind, that gives it any Preference; but on the contrary, the other Motive that stands in Competition with it, in all these Respects, has most belonging to it, that is inviting and moving, and has most of a Tendency to Choice and Preference? This is certainly as much as to say, there is previous Ground and Reason in the Motive for the Act of Preference, and yet no previous Reason for it. By the Supposition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives which tends to Preference, previous to the Act of Preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the other: because appearing superior Strength, and all appearing Preferableness is in that; and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Act of Preference is from previous Ground and Reason in the Motive which is preferred. But are these Things consistent? Can there be previous Ground in a Thing for an Event that takes Place, and yet no previous Tendency in it to that Event? If one Thing follows another, without any previous Tendency to it's following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any Manner of previous Reason why it should follow.