N05663:259
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If the Actions of Men — are not the Produce of a free Choice, or Election, but spring from a Necessity of Nature,— he cannot in Reason be the Object of Reward or Punishment on their Account. Whereas, if Action in Man, whether Good or Evil, is the Produce of Will or free Choice; so that a Man in either Case, had it in his Power, and was at Liberty to have CHOSEN the contrary, he is the proper Object of Reward or Punishment, according as he CHOOSES to behave Himself. Here in these last Words, he speaks of Liberty of CHOOSING, according as he CHOOSES. So that the Behaviour which he speaks of as subject to his Choice, is his choosing it self, as well as his external Conduct consequent upon it. And therefore 'tis evident, he means not only external Actions, but the Acts of Choice themselves, when he speaks of all free Actions, as the PRODUCE of free Choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he says in P. 372, & 373.
If the Actions of Men — are not the Produce of a free Choice, or Election, but spring from a Necessity of Nature,— he cannot in Reason be the Object of Reward or Punishment on their Account. Whereas, if Action in Man, whether Good or Evil, is the Produce of Will or free Choice; so that a Man in either Case, had it in his Power, and was at Liberty to have CHOSEN the contrary, he is the proper Object of Reward or Punishment, according as he CHUSES to behave Himself. Here in these last Words, he speaks of Liberty of CHUSING, according as he CHUSES. So that the Behaviour which he speaks of as subject to his Choice, is his chusing it self, as well as his external Conduct consequent upon it. And therefore 'tis evident, he means not only external Actions, but the Acts of Choice themselves, when he speaks of all free Actions, as the PRODUCE of free Choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he says in P. 372, & 373.
Now these Things imply a twofold great Absurdity and Inconsistence.