N05663:337
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necessity of Connection and Consequence, is not at all inconsistent with any Liberty which Man, or any other Creature enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute Decrees of God, which don't at all increase the Necessity, are not at all inconsistent with the Liberty which Man enjoys, on any such Account, as that they make the Event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore if absolute Decrees are inconsistent with Man's Liberty as a moral Agent, or his Liberty in a State of Probation, or any Liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on Account of any Necessity which absolute Decrees infer.
And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necessity of Connection and Consequence, is not at all inconsistent with any Liberty which Man, or any other Creature enjoys. And from hence it may be infer'd, that absolute Decrees of God, which don't at all increase the Necessity, are not at all inconsistent with the Liberty which Man enjoys, on any such Account, as that they make the Event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore if absolute Decrees are inconsistent with Man's Liberty as a moral Agent, or his Liberty in a State of Probation, or any Liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on Account of any Necessity which absolute Decrees infer.
Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great Difference between God's Foreknowledge, and his Decrees, with Regard to Necessity of future Events. In his Discourse on the five Points, P. 474, &c. He says, God's Prescience has no Influence at all on our Actions.— Should God (says he) by immediate Revelation, give me the Knowledge of the Event of any Man's State or Actions, would my Knowledge of them have any Influence upon his Actions? Surely none at all.— Our Knowledge doth not affect the Things we know, to make them more certain, or more future, than they would be without it. Now Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Knowledge has no Influence on Things that are, so neither has Foreknowledge on Things that shall be. And consequently, the Foreknowledge of any Action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that Freedom. Whereas God's Decree of Election is powerful & active, and comprehends the Preparation and Exhibition of such Means, as shall unfrustrably produce the End.— Hence God's Prescience renders no Actions necessary. And to this Purpose, P. 473. he cites Origen, where he says, God's Prescience is not the Cause of Things future, but their being future is the Cause of God's Prescience that they will be: And Le Blanc, where he says, This is the truest Resolution of this Difficulty, that Prescience is not the Cause that Things are future; but their being future is the Cause they are foreseen. In like Manner Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, P. 95, — 99. And the Author of the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, speaking to the like Purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents Foreknowledge as