A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

To all which I would say; That what is said about Knowledge, it's not having Influence on the Thing known to make it necessary, is Nothing to the Purpose, nor does it in the least affect the foregoing Reasoning. Whether Prescience be the Thing that makes the Event necessary or no, it alters not the Case. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Necessity of the Event foreknown, and yet not be the Thing which causes the Necessity. If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this proves the Event known to be necessary, or proves that 'tis impossible but that the Event should be, by some Means or other, either by a Decree, or some other Way, if there be any other Way: Because, as was said before, 'tis absurd to say, that a Proposition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.

The whole of the seeming Force of this Evasion lies in this; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge don't cause an Event to be necessary, as a Decree does; therefore it don't prove it to be necessary, as a Decree does. But there is no Force in this arguing: For it is built wholly on this Supposition, that Nothing can prove, or be an Evidence of a Thing's being necessary, but that which has a causal Influence to make it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existing of an Event, be not the Thing which first makes it impossible that it should fail of Existence; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that Impossibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the Cause, but the Effect of this Impossibility, it may prove that there is such an Impossibility, as much as if it were the Cause. It is as strong arguing from the Effect to the Cause, as from the Cause to the Effect. 'Tis enough, that an Existence which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that Impossibility arises from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. 'Tis as evident, as 'tis possible any Thing should be, that it is impossible a Thing which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be true: therefore there is a Necessity that it should be otherwise; whether the Knowledge be the Cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the Cause of the Knowledge.