A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-Knowledge, or concomitant Knowledge, proves the ⟨p. 125⟩Thing known now to be necessary, by some Means or other; or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true.— I freely allow, that Foreknowledge don't prove a Thing to be necessary any more than After-Knowledge: But then After-knowledge which is certain & infallible, proves that 'tis now become impossible but that the Proposition known should be true. Certain After-Knowledge proves that it is now, in the Time of the Knowledge, by some Means or other, become impossible but that the Proposition which predicates past Existence on the Event, should be true. And so does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the Time of the Knowledge, it is by some Means or other, become impossible but that the Proposition which predicates future Existence on the Event, should be true. The Necessity of the Truth of the Propositions, consisting in the present Impossibility of the Non-existence of the Event affirmed, in both Cases, is the immediate Ground of the certainty of the Knowledge; there can be no Certainty of Knowledge without it.

There must be a Certainty in Things themselves, before they are certainly known, or (which is the same Thing) known to be certain. For Certainty of Knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the Certainty there is in the Things themselves which are known. Therefore there must be a Certainty in Things to be a Ground of Certainty of Knowledge, and to render Things capable of being known to be certain. And this is Nothing but the Necessity of the Truth known, or it's being impossible but that it should be true; or, in other Words, the firm and infallible Connection between the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition that contains that Truth. All Certainty of Knowledge consists in the View of the Firmness of that Connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Existence of any Event, is his View of the firm and indissoluble Connection of the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition that affirms it's future Existence. The Subject is that possible Event; the Predicate is it's future existing: But if future Existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that Event, then the future Existence of that Event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future Existence of an Event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then He sees a firm Connection between a Subject and Predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a Contradiction.