A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

There must be a Certainty in Things themselves, before they are certainly known, or (which is the same Thing) known to be certain. For Certainty of Knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the Certainty there is in the Things themselves which are known. Therefore there must be a Certainty in Things to be a Ground of Certainty of Knowledge, and to render Things capable of being known to be certain. And this is Nothing but the Necessity of the Truth known, or it's being impossible but that it should be true; or, in other Words, the firm and infallible Connection between the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition that contains that Truth. All Certainty of Knowledge consists in the View of the Firmness of that Connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Existence of any Event, is his View of the firm and indissoluble Connection of the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition that affirms it's future Existence. The Subject is that possible Event; the Predicate is it's future existing: But if future Existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that Event, then the future Existence of that Event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future Existence of an Event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then He sees a firm Connection between a Subject and Predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a Contradiction.

I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, That mere Knowledge don't affect the Thing known, to make it more certain or m•re future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the Thing to be already, both future, and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of Futurity, supposes Futurity; and a certain Knowledge of Futurity, supposes certain Futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of Knowledge, than a prior Impossibility but that the Thing should prove true; or (which is the same Thing) the Necessity of the Event.

I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, That meer Knowledge don't affect the Thing known, to make it more certain or m•re future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the Thing to be already, both future, and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of Futurity, supposes Futurity; and a certain Knowledge of Futurity, supposes certain Futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of Knowledge, than a prior Impossibility but that the Thing should prove true; or (which is the same Thing) the Necessity of the Event.