N05663:343
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, That mere Knowledge don't affect the Thing known, to make it more certain or m•re future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the Thing to be already, both future, and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of Futurity, supposes Futurity; and a certain Knowledge of Futurity, supposes certain Futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of Knowledge, than a prior Impossibility but that the Thing should prove true; or (which is the same Thing) the Necessity of the Event.
I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, That meer Knowledge don't affect the Thing known, to make it more certain or m•re future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the Thing to be already, both future, and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of Futurity, supposes Futurity; and a certain Knowledge of Futurity, supposes certain Futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of Knowledge, than a prior Impossibility but that the Thing should prove true; or (which is the same Thing) the Necessity of the Event.
I would observe one Thing further concerning this Matter, and it is this; That if it be as those forementioned Writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the Cause, but the Effect of the Existence of the Event foreknown; this is so far from showing that this Foreknowledge don't infer the Necessity of the Existence of that Event, that it rather shows the contrary the more plainly. Because it shows the Existence of the Event to be so settled & firm, that it is as if it had already been; in as much as in Effect it actually exists already; it's future Existence has already had actual Influence and Efficiency, and has produced an Effect, viz. Prescience: The Effect exists already; and as the Effect supposes the Cause, is connected with the Cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future Event, which is the Cause, had existed already. The Effect is firm as possible, it having already the Possession of Existence, and has made sure of it. But the Effect can't be more firm and stable than it's Cause, Ground and Reason. The Building can't be firmer than the Foundation.