A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every Thing that is properly called a Motive, Excitement or Inducement to a perceiving willing Agent, has some Sort and Degree of Tendency, or Advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the Effect, or to the Act of the Will excited. This previous Tendency of the Motive is what I call the Strength of the Motive. That Motive which has a less Degree of previous Advantage or Tendency to move the Will, or that appears less inviting, as it stands in the View of the Mind, is what I call a weaker Motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the Understanding or Apprehension, the greatest Degree of previous Tendency to excite and induce the Choice, is what I call the strongest Motive. And in this Sense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the strongest Motive.

Things that exist in the View of the Mind, have their Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Circumstances of the Thing viewed, the Nature and Circumstances of the Mind that views, and the Degree & Manner of its View; which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect Enumeration of. But so much I think may be determined in general, without Room for Controversy, that whatever […] perceived or apprehended by an intelligent & voluntary […], which has the Nature and Influence of a Motive to Volition or Choice, is considered or viewed as good; nor has it any Tendency to invite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance they make, to engage the Mind to elect them, some other Way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some Sense, that the Will alway• is as the greatest apparent Good is. But only, for the right understanding of this, two Things must be well and inst•nctly observed.

Things that exist in the View of the Mind, have their Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Circumstances of the Thing view'd, the Nature and Circumstances of the Mind that views, and the Degree & Manner of its View; which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect Enumeration of. But so much I think may be determind in general, without Room for Controversy, that whateve perceived or apprehended by an intelligent & voluntar , which has the Nature and Influence of a Motive to Voliion or Choice, is consider'd or view'd as good; nor has it any Tendency to invite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance they make, to engage the Mind to elect them, some other Way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some Sense, that the Will alway is as the greatest apparent Good is. But only, for the riht understanding of this, two Things must be well and instnctly observed.