N05663:40
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 1 › Section 2: Concerning the Determination of the Will.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Things that exist in the View of the Mind, have their Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Circumstances of the Thing viewed, the Nature and Circumstances of the Mind that views, and the Degree & Manner of its View; which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect Enumeration of. But so much I think may be determined in general, without Room for Controversy, that whatever […] perceived or apprehended by an intelligent & voluntary […], which has the Nature and Influence of a Motive to Volition or Choice, is considered or viewed as good; nor has it any Tendency to invite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance they make, to engage the Mind to elect them, some other Way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some Sense, that the Will alway• is as the greatest apparent Good is. But only, for the right understanding of this, two Things must be well and inst•nctly observed.
Things that exist in the View of the Mind, have their Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Circumstances of the Thing view'd, the Nature and Circumstances of the Mind that views, and the Degree & Manner of its View; which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect Enumeration of. But so much I think may be determin•d in general, without Room for Controversy, that whateve• 〈…〉 perceived or apprehended by an intelligent & voluntar• 〈…〉, which has the Nature and Influence of a Motive to Voli•ion or Choice, is consider'd or view'd as good; nor has it any Tendency to invite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance they make, to engage the Mind to elect them, some other Way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some Sense, that the Will alway• is as the greatest apparent Good is. But only, for the riht understanding of this, two Things must be well and instnctly observed.