N05663:41
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 1 › Section 2: Concerning the Determination of the Will.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. It must be observed in what Sense I use the Term Good; namely, as of the same Import with Agreeable. To appear good to the Mind, as I use the Phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the Mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the Mind, or tending to engage it's Inclination and Choice, considered as evil or disagreeable; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the Inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the Notion of that which suits the Mind. And therefore that must have the greatest Tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the Mind's View, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that Sense, is the greatest apparent Good: to say otherwise, is little, if any Thing, short of a direct and plain Contradiction.
1. It must be observed in what Sense I use the Term Good; namely, as of the same Import with Agreable. To appear good to the Mind, as I use the Phrase, is the same as to appear agreable, or seem pleasing to the Mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the Mind, or tending to engage it's I•c•ination and Choice, considered as evil or disagreable; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreable nor disagreable. But if it tends to draw the Inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the Notion of that which suits the Mind. And therefore that must have the greatest Tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the Mind's View, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that Sense, is the greatest apparent Good: to say otherwise, is little, if any Thing, short of a direct and plain Contradiction.
The Word Good, in this Sense, includes in its Signification, the Removal or Avoiding of Evil, or of that which is disagreeable & uneasy. 'Tis agreeable and pleasing, to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have Uneasiness removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes determines the Will. For when he speaks of Uneasiness as determining the Will, he must be understood as supposing that the End or Aim which governs in the Volition or Act of Preference, is the Avoiding or Removal of that Uneasiness; and that is the same Thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable.