N05663:425
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 3 › Section 4: Command, and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And thus the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of the Will consisting in the Soul's determining it's own Acts of Will, instead of being essential to moral Agency, and to Men's being the Subjects of moral Government, is utterly inconsistent with it. For if the Soul determines all it's Acts of Will, it is therein subject to no Command or moral Government, as has been now observed; because it's original determining Act is no Act of Will or Choice, it being prior, by the Supposition, to every Act of Will. And the Soul can't be the Subject of Command in the Act of the Will it self, which depends on the foregoing determining Act, and is determined by it; in as much as this is necessary, being the necessary Consequence and Effect of that prior determining Act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the Man be the Subject of Command or Government in his external Actions; because these are all necessary, being the necessary Effects of the Acts of the Will themselves. So that Mankind, according to this Scheme, are Subjects of Command or moral Government in nothing ⟨p. 162⟩at all; and all their moral Agency is entirely excluded, and no Room left for Virtue or Vice in the World.
And thus the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of the Will consisting in the Soul's determining it's own Acts of Will, instead of being essential to moral Agency, and to Men's being the Subjects of moral Government, is utterly inconsistent with it. For if the Soul determines all it's Acts of Will, it is therein subject to no Command or moral Government, as has been now observed; because it's original determining Act is no Act of Will or Choice, it being prior, by the Supposition, to every Act of Will. And the Soul can't be the Subject of Command in the Act of the Will it self, which depends on the foregoing determining Act, and is determined by it; in as much as this is necessary, being the necessary Consequence and Effect of that prior determining Act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the Man be the Subject of Command or Government in his external Actions; because these are all necessary, being the necessary Effects of the Acts of the Will themselves. So that Mankind, according to this Scheme, are Subjects of Command or moral Government in nothing ⟨p. 162⟩at all; and all their moral Agency is entirely excluded, and no Room left for Vertue or Vice in the World.