A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

II. Having shown that the Will it self, especially in those Acts which are original, leading and determining in any Case, is the proper Subject of Precept and Command, and not only those Alterations in the Body, &c. which are the Effects of the Will; I now proceed in the second Place, to observe that the very Opposition or Defect of the Will it self, in that Act which is it's original and determining Act in the Case, I say the Will's Opposition in this Act to a Thing proposed or commanded, or it's failing of Compliance, implies a moral Inability to that Thing: Or in other Words, whenever a Command requires a certain State or Act of the Will, and the Person commanded, notwithstanding the Command and the Circumstances under which it is exhibited, still finds his Will opposite or wanting, in that, belonging to it's State or Acts, which is original and determining in the Affair, that Man is morally unable to obey that Command.

II. Having shewn that the Will it self, especially in those Acts which are original, leading and determining in any Case, is the proper Subject of Precept and Command, and not only those Alterations in the Body, &c. which are the Effects of the Will; I now proceed in the second Place, to observe that the very Opposition or Defect of the Will it self, in that Act which is it's original and determining Act in the Case, I say the Will's Opposition in this Act to a Thing proposed or commanded, or it's failing of Compliance, implies a moral Inability to that Thing: Or in other Words, whenever a Command requires a certain State or Act of the Will, and the Person commanded, notwithstanding the Command and the Circumstances under which it is exhibited, still finds his Will opposite or wanting, in that, belonging to it's State or Acts, which is original and determining in the Affair, that Man is morally unable to obey that Command.

This is manifest from what was observed in the first Part, concerning the Nature of moral Inability, as distinguished from natural: where it was observed, That a Man may then be said to be morally unable to do a Thing, when He is under the Influence or Prevalence of a contrary Inclination, or has a Want of Inclination, under such Circumstances and Views. 'Tis also evident from what has been before proved, that the Will is always, and in every individual Act, necessarily determined by the strongest Motive; and so is always unable to go against the Motive, which all Things considered, has now the greatest Strength and Advantage to move the Will.— But not further to insist on these Things, the Truth of the Position now laid down, viz. That when the Will is opposite to, or failing of a Compliance with a Thing in it's original determining Inclination or Act, it is not able to comply, appears by the Consideration of these two Things.