N05663:428
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 3 › Section 4: Command, and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
This is manifest from what was observed in the first Part, concerning the Nature of moral Inability, as distinguished from natural: where it was observed, That a Man may then be said to be morally unable to do a Thing, when He is under the Influence or Prevalence of a contrary Inclination, or has a Want of Inclination, under such Circumstances and Views. 'Tis also evident from what has been before proved, that the Will is always, and in every individual Act, necessarily determined by the strongest Motive; and so is always unable to go against the Motive, which all Things considered, has now the greatest Strength and Advantage to move the Will.— But not further to insist on these Things, the Truth of the Position now laid down, viz. That when the Will is opposite to, or failing of a Compliance with a Thing in it's original determining Inclination or Act, it is not able to comply, appears by the Consideration of these two Things.
1. The Will in the Time of that diverse or opposite leading Act or Inclination, and when actually under the Influence of it, is not able to exert it self to the contrary, to make an Alteration, in order to a Compliance. The Inclination is unable to change it self; and that for this plain Reason, that it is unable to incline to change it self. Present Choice can't •t present choose to be otherwise: for that would be at present to choose something diverse from what is at present chosen. If the Will, all Things now considered, inclines or chooses to go that Way, then it can't choose, all Things now considered, to go the other Way, and so can't choose to be made to go the other Way. To suppose that the Mind is now sincerely inclined to change it self to a different Inclination, is to suppose the Mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined. The Will may oppose some future remote Act that it is exposed to, but not its own present Act.
1. The Will in the Time of that diverse or opposite leading Act or Inclination, and when actually under the Influence of it, is not able to exert it self to the contrary, to make an Alteration, in order to a Compliance. The Inclination is unable to change it self; and that for this plain Reason, that it is unable to incline to change it self. Present Choice can't t present chuse to be otherwise: for that would be at present to chuse something diverse from what is at present chosen. If the Will, all Things now considered, inclines or chuses to go that Way, then it can't chuse, all Things now considered, to go the other Way, and so can't chuse to be made to go the other Way. To suppose that the Mind is now sincerely inclined to change it self to a different Inclination, is to suppose the Mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined. The Will may oppose some future remote Act that it is exposed to, but not its own present Act.