A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

I answer, (1.) In this Objection that seems to be forgotten which was observed before, viz. that the determining to take the Matter into Consideration, is it self an Act of the Will: And if this be all the Act wherein the Mind exercises Ability and Freedom, then this, by the Supposition, must be all that can be commanded or required by Precept. And if this Act be the commanded Act, then all that has been observed concerning the commanded Act of the Will remains true, that the very Want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are speaking concerning the first and leading Act of the Will in the Case, or about the Affair; And if a Determining to deliberate, or on the contrary, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading Act; or whether it be or no, if there be another Act before it, which determines that; or whatever be the original and leading Act; still the foregoing Proof stands good, that the Non-compliance of the leading Act implies moral Inability to comply.

If it should be objected, that these Things make all moral Inability equal, and suppose Men morally unable to will otherwise than they actually do will, in all Cases, and equally so, in every Instance.

In answer to this Objection, I desire two Things may be observed. First, That if by being equally unable, be meant as really unable; then so far •s the Inability is merely moral, 'tis true, the Will, in every Instance, acts by moral Necessity, ⟨p. 165⟩and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and proper•y in one Case as another; as, I humbly conceive, has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding Part of this Essay. But yet, in some Respect, the Inability may be said to be greater in some Instances than others: Tho' the Man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do some Things than others. As it is in Things which Men are naturally unable to do. A Person whose Strength is no more than sufficient to lift the Weight of one Hundred Pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one Hundred and one Pounds, as ten Thousand Pounds; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter Weight than the former; and so, according to common Use of Speech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A Man is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present Inclination, which in the least Degree prevails; or contrary to that Motive, which, all Things considered, has Strength and Advantage now to move the Will, in the least Degree, superior to all other Motives in View: But yet he is further from Ability to resist a very strong Habit, and a violent and deeply rooted Inclination, or a Motive vastly exceeding all others in Strength. And again, the Inability may in some Respects be called greater, in some Instances than others, as it may be more general and extensive to all Acts of that Kind. So Men may be said to be unable in a different Sense, and to be further from moral Ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only that Inability which is occasional and particular.