A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

In answer to this Objection, I desire two Things may be observed. First, That if by being equally unable, be meant as really unable; then so far •s the Inability is merely moral, 'tis true, the Will, in every Instance, acts by moral Necessity, ⟨p. 165⟩and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and proper•y in one Case as another; as, I humbly conceive, has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding Part of this Essay. But yet, in some Respect, the Inability may be said to be greater in some Instances than others: Tho' the Man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do some Things than others. As it is in Things which Men are naturally unable to do. A Person whose Strength is no more than sufficient to lift the Weight of one Hundred Pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one Hundred and one Pounds, as ten Thousand Pounds; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter Weight than the former; and so, according to common Use of Speech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A Man is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present Inclination, which in the least Degree prevails; or contrary to that Motive, which, all Things considered, has Strength and Advantage now to move the Will, in the least Degree, superior to all other Motives in View: But yet he is further from Ability to resist a very strong Habit, and a violent and deeply rooted Inclination, or a Motive vastly exceeding all others in Strength. And again, the Inability may in some Respects be called greater, in some Instances than others, as it may be more general and extensive to all Acts of that Kind. So Men may be said to be unable in a different Sense, and to be further from moral Ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only that Inability which is occasional and particular. ^†Thus in Cases of natural Inability; he that is born blind may be said to be unable to see, in a different Manner, and is in some Respects further from being able to see, than He whose Sight is hindered by a transient Cloud or Mist.

In answer to this Objection, I desire two Things may be observed. First, That if by being equally unable, be meant as really unable; then so far s the Inability is meerly moral, 'tis true, the Will, in every Instance, acts by moral Necessity,