N05663:435
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 3 › Section 4: Command, and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And besides, that which was observed in the first Part of this Discourse concerning the Inability which attends a strong and settled Habit, should be here remembered; viz. That fixed Habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is distinguished from occasional Volition, namely, that Endeavours to avoid future Volitions of that Kind, which are agreeable to such a Habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and insufficient. For tho' it is impossible ⟨p. 166⟩there should be any true sincere Desires and Endeavours against a present Volition or Choice, yet there may be against Volitions of that Kind, when viewed at a Distance. A Person may desire and use Means to prevent future Exercises of a certain Inclination; and in order to it, may wish the Habit might be removed; but his Desires and Endeavours may be ineffectual. The Man may be said in some Sense to be unable; yea, even as the Word unable is a relative Term, and has Relation to ineffectual Endeavours; yet not with Regard to present, but remote Endeavours.
And besides, that which was observed in the first Part of this Discourse concerning the Inability which attends a strong and settled Habit, should be here remember'd; viz. That fix'd Habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is distinguished from occasional Volition, namely, that Endeavours to avoid future Volitions of that Kind, which are agreable to such a Habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and insufficient. For tho' it is impossible ⟨p. 166⟩there should be any true sincere Desires and Endeavours against a present Volition or Choice, yet there may be against Volitions of that Kind, when view'd at a Distance. A Person may desire and use Means to prevent future Exercises of a certain Inclination; and in order to it, may wish the Habit might be removed; but his Desires and Endeavours may be ineffectual. The Man may be said in some Sense to be unable; yea, even as the Word unable is a relative Term, and has Relation to ineffectual Endeavours; yet not with Regard to present, but remote Endeavours.