A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

I have rather chosen to express my self thus, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent Good, or as what appears most agreeable, is, than to say that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent Good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the Mind, and the Mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct. If strict Propriety of Speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary Action which is the immediate Consequence and Fruit of the Mind's Volition or Choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the Preference or Choice it self; but that the Act of Volition it self is always determined by that in or about the Mind's View of the Object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say, in or about the Mind's View of the Object, because what has Influence to render an Object in View agreeable, is not only what appears in the Object viewed, but also the Manner of the View, and the State and Circumstances of the Mind that views.—Particularly to enumerate all Things pertaining to the Mind's View of the Objects of Volition, which have Influence in their appearing agreeable to the Mind, would be a Matter of no small Difficulty, and might require a Treatise by it self, and is not necessary to my present Purpose. I shall therefore only mention some Things in general.

I have rather chosen to express my self thus, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent Good, or as what appears most agreable, is, than to say that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent Good, or by what seems most agreable; because an appearing most agreable or pleasing to the Mind, and the Mind's preferring and chusing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct. If strict Propriety of Speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary Action which is the immediate Consequence and Fruit of the Mind's Volition or Choice, is determined by that which appears most agreable, than the Preference or Choice it self; but that the Act of Volition it self is always determin'd by that in or about the Mind's View of the Object, which causes it to appear most agreable. I say, in or about the Mind's View of the Object, because what has Influence to render an Object in View agreable, is not only what appears in the Object view'd, but also the Manner of the View, and the State and Circumstances of the Mind that views.—Particularly to enumerate all Things pertaining to the Mind's View of the Objects of Volition, which have Influence in their appearing agreable to the Mind, would be a Matter of no small Difficulty, and might require a Treatise by it self, and is not necessary to my present Purpose. I shall therefore only mention some Things in general.