A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an Act of Will in a State of Indifference; for Instance, this Act, viz. The Will's determining to put it self out of a Stat• of Indifference, and give it self a Preponderation one Way, then it would follow, on Arminian ⟨p. 179⟩Principles, that this Act or Determination of the Will is that alone wherein Virtue consists, because this only is performed while the Mind remains in a State of Indifference, and so in a State of Liberty: For when once the Mind is put out of it's Equilibrium, it is no longer in such a State; and therefore all the Acts which follow afterwards, proceeding from Bias, can have the Nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the Thing which the Will can do, while yet in a State of Indifference, and so of Liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the Matter into Consideration, then this Determination is that alone wherein Virtue consists, and not proceeding to Action after the Scale is turned by Consideration. So that it will follow from these Principles, all that is done after the Mind, by any Means, is once out of it's Equilibrium and already possessed by an Inclination, and arising from that Inclination, has nothing of the Nature of Virtue or Vice, and is worthy of neither […] or Praise. But how plainly contrary is this to the univer••• Sense of Mankind, and to the Notion they have of […] virtuous Actions? Which is, that they are Actions which proceed from a Heart well disposed and inclined; and the stronger, and the more fixed and determined the good Disposition of the Heart, the greater the Sincerity of Virtue, and so the more of the Truth and Reality of it. But if there be any Acts which are done in a State of Equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect Indifference and Coldness of Heart, they cannot arise from any good Principle or Disposition in the Heart; and consequently, according to common Sense, have no sincere Goodness in 'em, having no Virtue of Heart in 'em. To have a virtuous Heart, is to have a Heart that favours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it.

If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an Act of Will in a State of Indifference; for Instance, this Act, viz. The Will's determining to put it self out of a Stat• of Indifference, and give it self a Preponderation one Way, then it would follow, on Arminian