A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

Corol. 1. By these Things it appears, that the Argument against the Calvinists, taken from the Use of Counsels, Exhortations, Invitations, Expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by Arminians, is truly against themselves. For these Things can operate no other Way to any good Effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and determine the Acts of the Will. But it follows on their Principles, that the Acts of Will excited by such Causes, can't be virtuous; because so far as they are from these, they are not from the Will's self-determining Power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth the while to offer any Arguments to persuade Men to any virtuous Volition or voluntary ⟨p. 189⟩Action; 'tis in vain to set before them the Wisdom and Amiableness of Ways of Virtue, or the Odiousness and Folly of Ways of Vice. This Notion of Liberty and moral Agency frustrates all Endeavours to draw Men to Virtue by Instruction, or Persuasion, Precept, or Example: For tho' these Things may induce Men to what is materially virtuous, yet at the same Time they take away the Form of Virtue, because they destroy Liberty; as they, by their own Power, put the Will out of it's Equilibrium, determine and turn the Scale, and take the Work of self-determining Power out of it's Hands. And the clearer the Instructions are that are given, the more powerful the Arguments that are used, and the more moving the Persuasions or Examples, the more likely they are to frustrate their own Design; Because they have so much the greater Tendency to put the Will out of it's Balance, to hinder it's Freedom of self-determination; and so to exclude the very Form of Virtue, and the Essence of whatsoever is Praiseworthy.

Corol. 1. By these Things it appears, that the Argument against the Calvinists, taken from the Use of Counsels, Exhortations, Invitations, Expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by Arminians, is truly against themselves. For these Things can operate no other Way to any good Effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and determine the Acts of the Will. But it follows on their Principles, that the Acts of Will excited by such Causes, can't be vertuous; because so far as they are from these, they are not from the Will's self-determining Power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth the while to offer any Arguments to perswade Men to any vertuous Volition or voluntary ⟨p. 189⟩