N05663:50
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 1 › Section 2: Concerning the Determination of the Will.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
II. Another Thing that contributes to the Agreeableness of an Object of Choice, as it stands in the Mind's View, is the Manner of the View. If the Object be something which appears connected with future Pleasure, not only will the Degree of apparent Pleasure have Influence, but also the Manner of the View, especially in two Respects.
II. Another Thing that contributes to the Agreableness of an Object of Choice, as it stands in the Mind's View, is the Manner of the View. If the Object be something which appears connected with future Pleasure, not only will the Degree of apparent Pleasure have Influence, but also the Manner of the View, especially in two Respects.
1. With respect to the Degree of Judgment, or Firmness of Assent, with which the Mind judges the Pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain Happiness, than an uncertain one; and a Pleasure viewed as more probable, all other Things being equal, is more agreeable to the Mind, than that which is viewed as less probable.
1. With respect to the Degree of Iudgment, or Firmness of Assent, with which the Mind judges the Pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreable to have a certain Happiness, than an uncertain one; and a Pleasure view'd as more probable, all other Things being equal, is more agreable to the Mind, than that which is view'd as less probable.
2. With respect to the Degree of the Idea of the future Pleasure. With Regard to Things which are the Subject of our Thoughts, either past, present or future, we have much more of an Idea or Apprehension of some Things than others; that is, our Idea is much more clear, lively and strong. Thus, the Ideas we have of sensible Things by immediate Sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere Imagination, or by Contemplation of them when absent.