A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

Now, if this Matter be well considered, it will appear to be altogether a Mistake, yea, a gross-Absurdity; and that it is most certain, that if there be any such Things, as a virtuous, or vicious Disposition, or Volition of Mind, the Virtuousness or Viciousness of them consists not in the Origin or Cause of these Things, but in the Nature of them.

Now, if this Matter be well considered, it will appear to be altogether a Mistake, yea, a gross-Absurdity; and that it is most certain, that if there be any such Things, as a vertuous, or vicious Disposition, or Volition of Mind, the Vertuousness or Viciousness of them consists not in the Origin or Cause of these Things, but in the Nature of them.

If the Essence of Virtuousness or Commendableness, and of Viciousness or Fault, don't lie in the Nature of the Dispositions or Acts of Mind, which are said to be our Virtue or our Fault, but in their Cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for Instance, if the Vice of a vicious Act of Will, lies not in the Nature of the Act, but the Cause; so that it's being of a bad Nature will not make it at all our Fault, unless it arises from some faulty Determination of our's as it's Cause, or something in us that is our Fault; then for the same Reason, neither can the Viciousness of that Cause lie in the Nature of the Thing it self, but in it's Cause: that evil Determination of our's is not our Fault, merely because it is of a bad Nature, unless it arises from some Cause in us that is our Fault. And when we are come to this higher Cause, still the Reason of the Thing holds good; tho' this Cause be of a bad Nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that Account, unless it arises from something faulty in us. Nor yet can Blame-worthiness lie in the Nature of this Cause, but in the Cause of that. And thus we must drive Faultiness back from Step to Step, from a lower Cause to a higher, in infinitum: and that is thoroughly to banish it from the World, and to allow it no possibility of Existence any where in the Universality of Things. On these Principles, Vice or moral Evil can't consist in any Thing that is an Effect; because Fault don't consist in the Nature of Things, but in their Cause; as well as because Effects are necessary, being unavoidably connected with their Cause: therefore the Cause only is to blame. And so it follows, that Faultiness can lie only in that Cause, which is a Cause only, and no Effect of any Thing. Nor yet can it lie in this; for then it must lie in the Nature of the Thing it self; not in it's being