N05663:507
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
This is certain, that if Effects are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature, or from any Thing inherent in them, but because they are from a bad Cause, it must be on Account of the Badness of the Cause; and so on Account of the Nature of the Cause: A bad Effect in the Will must be bad, because the Cause is bad, or of an evil Nature, or has Badness as a Quality inherent in it: and a good Effect in the Will must be good, by Reason of the Goodness of the Cause, or it's being of a good Kind and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the very Supposition of Fault and Praise lying not in the Nature of the Thing, but the Cause, contradicts it self, and does at least resolve the Essence of Virtue and Vice into the Nature of Things, and supposes it originally to consist in that.— And if a Caviller has a Mind to run from the Absurdity, by saying, No, the Fault of the Thing which is the Cause, lies not in this, that the Cause it self is of an evil Nature, but that the Cause is evil in that Sense, that it is from another bad Cause. Still the Absurdity will follow him; for if so, then the Cause before charged is at once acquitted, and all the Blame must be laid to the higher Cause, and must consist in that's being Evil, or of an evil Nature. So now we are come again to lay the Blame of the Thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the Thing, and not to the Cause. And if any is so foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from Step to Step, till he is come to that which is the first Cause concerned in the whole Affair, and will say, all the Blame lies in that; then at last he must be forced to own, that the Faultiness of the Thing which he supposes alone blame-worthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the Thing, and not in the Original or Cause of it; for the Supposition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by no Act of our's, is caused by nothing faulty in us, being absolutely without any Cause. And so the Race is at an End, but the Evader is taken in his Flight.
This is certain, that if Effects are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature, or from any Thing inherent in them, but because they are from a bad Cause, it must be on Account of the Badness of the Cause; and so on Account of the Nature of the Cause: A bad Effect in the Will must be bad, because the Cause is bad, or of an evil Nature, or has Badness as a Quality inherent in it: and a good Effect in the Will must be good, by Reason of the Goodness of the Cause, or it's being of a good Kind and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the very Supposition of Fault and Praise lying not in the Nature of the Thing, but the Cause, contradicts it self, and does at least resolve the Essence of Vertue and Vice into the Nature of Things, and supposes it originally to consist in that.— And if a Caviller has a Mind to run from the Absurdity, by saying, No, the Fault of the Thing which is the Cause, lies not in this, that the Cause it self is of an evil Nature, but that the Cause is evil in that Sense, that it is from another bad Cause. Still the Absurdity will follow him; for if so, then the Cause before charged is at once acquitted, and all the Blame must be laid to the higher Cause, and must consist in that's being Evil, or of an evil Nature. So now we are come again to lay the Blame of the Thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the Thing, and not to the Cause. And if any is so foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from Step to Step, till he is come to that which is the first Cause concerned in the whole Affair, and will say, all the Blame lies in that; then at last he must be forced to own, that the Faultiness of the Thing which he supposes alone blame-worthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the Thing, and not in the Original or Cause of it; for the Supposition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by no Act of our's, is caused by nothing faulty in us, being absolutely without any Cause. And so the Race is at an End, but the Evader is taken in his Flight.